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 I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Disclosure requirements appear to offer a simple way to regulate 
complex markets. When disclosure is required, the parties to a 
transaction are more fully informed, and so, presumably, made bet-
ter off without the need for a regulator to evaluate the merits of par-
ticular transactions. But the appeal of disclosure requirements is il-
lusory. The costs and benefits of imposing disclosure requirements 
are complex, highly dependent on the context in which they are im-
posed, and generally difficult to measure. The ramifications of requir-
ing disclosure usually range well beyond what is intended. 
 Nowhere is this discord between the simplistic appeal and com-
plex reality of requiring disclosure more evident than in the federal 
government’s regulation of public company securities. Disclosure re-
quirements are the primary tool the federal government uses to regu-
late public company securities.1 To comply with disclosure require-
ments, U.S. public companies produce more than one million pages of 
information every month.2 But neither the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), with its reliance on the amorphous goal of main-
                                                                                                                    
 1. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (“This Court ‘repeatedly 
has described the “fundamental purpose” of the [Exchange] Act [of 1934] as implementing 
a “philosophy of full disclosure.”’” (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 
477-78 (1977) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 
(1963)))).  
 2. This estimate is based on the author’s review of pages filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in May 2004. This estimate probably understates future 
filing levels, since it is based on filings made prior to the complete implementation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (West Supp. 
2003) (Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act] 
(instituting mechanisms to improve the reliability of public companies’ disclosures). 





taining “investor confidence,”3 nor the academic community, offering 
market failure arguments that are, at best, incomplete,4 can provide 
an adequate justification for federally mandating the information 
public companies must disclose. An immense regulatory edifice is 
built on an unsubstantiated faith in the efficacy of requiring disclo-
sure.5 
 This Article addresses the lack of adequate justification for feder-
ally imposed disclosure requirements by starting de novo and consid-
ering which, if any, disclosure requirements should be imposed on 
public companies. To do this, the significant costs and benefits of dis-
closure are identified. Then a market failure argument for regulating 
public company disclosures that weighs both the costs and benefits of 
regulatory intervention is developed. Finally, this framework is used 
to evaluate a specific disclosure requirement. The analysis leads to a 
surprising conclusion. Federal public company disclosure require-
ments are inadequate in at least one important respect, not because 
there are too many disclosure requirements, but because there are 
too few. Public company managers should be required to disclose sub-
stantially more of the information they use to manage their firms’ 
operations than they are currently required to disclose. 
 Requiring full and fair disclosure became the cornerstone of fed-
eral securities regulation without much preliminary analysis. Frank-
lin Delano Roosevelt, during his 1932 Presidential campaign, prom-
ised to enact federal legislation to protect investors.6 Roosevelt cited 
the prophylactic benefits of requiring disclosure, echoing the senti-
ments of Louis Brandeis’ 1914 book, Other People’s Money.7 The for-
                                                                                                                    
 3. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) (noting an excessive reliance on disclosure requirements by the SEC 
and arguing that “disclosure’s continued allure for the SEC stems from its being a ‘com-
promise’ solution, midway between doing nothing and regulating substantive conduct” and 
that the SEC “instead prefers to remain above the grubbiness of empirical data, preferring 
to ground its policy prescriptions in ‘investor confidence’”); see also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 173 (2002) (noting the absence of empirical support for 
policies implemented by the SEC). 
 4. See infra Part II.C. 
 5. Many scholars reach a similar conclusion as to the inadequacy of justifications for 
federal intervention into the disclosure practices of public companies. See, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 
VA. L. REV. 669, 715 (1984) (concluding about public company disclosure regulation “we 
cannot identify either benefit or detriment”); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Informa-
tion Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical 
Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405, 414 (2001) (concluding after a review of 
the research on disclosure requirements that “surprisingly little is known about why fi-
nancial reporting and disclosure is regulated in the capital market”).  
 6. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 41-42 (1982) 
(describing the securities regulation aspect of Roosevelt’s campaign). 
 7. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
(1914). Roosevelt referred to Brandeis’ argument that “publicity is justly commended as a 
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mative draft of what was to become the Securities Act of 1933 bor-
rowed heavily from the English Companies Act, an act that required 
companies issuing public securities to disclose benefits granted to 
promoters and underwriters.8 So it was not surprising that the secu-
rities legislation enacted in 1933 required “full and fair” disclosure as 
the way to protect investors.9 
 But investor protection does not provide a sound justification for 
imposing federal disclosure requirements on public companies. Start-
ing in the 1960s, economists asked straightforward questions that 
could not be answered. Would it not be more efficient to let investors 
and owners agree among themselves as to what information a com-
pany would disclose?10 Once disclosure practices are agreed upon, 
would not all investors be protected, since securities prices rapidly 
                                                                                                                    
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.” Id. at 92.  
 8. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 29, 34 (1959). 
 9. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (holding that the Securities 
Act of 1933 was intended “to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information 
thought necessary to informed investment decisions”); Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclo-
sure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 316 
(1974) (“[T]he overriding concern of Congress in passing the [Securities and Exchange 
Acts] was to provide protection for small investors . . . .”); Joel Seligman, The Historical 
Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983) (reviewing the 
justifications of investor protection and information dissemination that were provided for 
the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Acts). An earlier draft of this legislation re-
quired the federal government to also undertake an evaluation of the soundness of compa-
nies wishing to raise funds, but Congressman Sam Rayburn, whose Commerce Committee 
oversaw the proposed securities legislation in the House, objected to granting such broad 
substantive review power to a federal agency. SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 53-57.  
 10. See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of 
Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 
(Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979) (arguing that market mechanisms ensure that managers 
will provide an efficient level of disclosure). The specific arguments that Ross offers have 
proven problematic. First, Ross argues that market mechanisms will be effective because 
of managers’ desire to maintain their reputation. Id. at 183-85. But scenarios exist in 
which labor markets fail to lead to an efficient level of disclosure. For example, managers 
may choose not to disclose particularly “bad” news if the firm is near collapse. See Mitu 
Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The Case of In-
terim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 691-702 (1999) (discussing the final-period 
problem, when managers assume they will be exiting the labor markets); see also Jennifer 
H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory 
and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (finding an increased tendency for corporate man-
agers to commit fraud in their last period of employment). Second, Ross argues that infor-
mation unraveling (in certain circumstances all private information, whether good or bad, 
is disclosed lest others assume the worst) would lead to the disclosure of all relevant in-
formation about the firm without regulatory intervention. Ross, supra, at 185-88. But it 
now seems unlikely that unraveling will lead to the disclosure of all relevant information 
by public companies. See infra note 136 and accompanying text (providing one explanation 
for why unraveling does not occur); see also Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions 
Are Not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic 
Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 265-77 (2002) 
(providing alternative explanations for why complete unraveling does not occur in the dis-
closure of information by public companies). 





incorporate information?11 How do disclosure requirements protect 
investors from fraud when someone intent on defrauding investors 
can simply disclose false information? Numerous empirical studies 
failed to discern clear benefits from the imposition of federal disclo-
sure requirements on public companies.12 
 More sophisticated justifications for the federal regulation of pub-
lic company disclosure practices have followed. Some scholars argue 
that federal disclosure requirements are a useful way to address con-
tracting problems that arise when companies and investors try to ne-
gotiate disclosure practices.13 A company’s owner might otherwise 
have difficulty convincing investors that she would continue to make 
full and fair disclosures once funds are invested. However, recent 
scholarship has shown that there are better solutions to these con-
tracting problems than mandatory federal disclosure regulation.14 
                                                                                                                    
 11. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (describing the various ways in which information about a firm 
is rapidly incorporated into public securities prices). 
 12. For an analysis of the effects of the Securities Act of 1933, see Gregg A. Jarrell, 
The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. 
& ECON. 613 (1981); Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor In-
formation and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1989); George J. 
Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964). For an analysis 
of the effects of the Exchange Act of 1934, see George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and 
the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 
132 (1973); George J. Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-
Required Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1977, 
at 30. For a discussion of these empirical analyses, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Manda-
tory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1341 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure] (“I find the results of 
these empirical studies to be inconclusive.”); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A 
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2372 (1998) [hereinafter 
Romano, Empowering Investors] (“Even today, little empirical evidence suggests that the 
federal [securities regulation] regime has affirmatively benefited investors.”). See generally 
Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 464-93 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Need for Competition] 
(reviewing the implications and limitations of the findings from these studies). But see Mi-
chael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock 
Returns, and the 1962 Securities Act Amendments (March 2004) (unpublished manuscript) 
(finding significant positive effects from the 1964 Securities Act Amendments, which im-
posed new disclosure requirements on firms whose securities were traded over the 
counter), available at http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/vissing/htm/secotc3272.pdf (last 
visited July 2, 2004).  
 13. See, e.g., Franco, supra note 10, at 289 (arguing that mandatory disclosure re-
quirements provide a system that “significantly constrains issuer discretion to withhold in-
formation strategically”); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency 
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1090-93 (1995) (arguing that requiring the disclosure of 
information about transactions between a firm and its agents is so common that it should 
be made a mandatory rule); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credi-
ble Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002) (arguing 
that federally imposed requirements are the best way to address contracting problems). 
 14. For example, an issuer could select the domain under which its securities would 
be regulated, much as companies now select the state in which they will incorporate. Such 
a federalist approach would avoid the costs of establishing a regulatory monopoly. See 
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 Others argue that regulatory intervention is justified because of a 
market failure in the disclosure practices of public companies. These 
scholars point to the fact that companies have difficulty capturing the 
benefits their disclosures provide either (1) to the disclosing firm’s 
competitors (interfirm externalities)15 or (2) to investors who use the 
information disclosed, but do not own the firm’s securities.16 But 
these market failure arguments do not weigh the costs of regulatory 
intervention or specify which particular disclosure requirements 
would ameliorate the identified market failure.17 
 Determining which, if any, disclosure requirements should be fed-
erally imposed on public companies is a matter of some urgency. Se-
curities markets are increasingly global.18 As a result, scholars and 
regulators are in the midst of trying to determine how different na-
tional securities regulation regimes should be integrated.19 Also, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in response to the dramatic stock mar-
ket decline from 2000 through 200220 and the record-setting level of 
                                                                                                                    
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International 
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998) (arguing that regulatory com-
petition would be beneficial because of the diversity of disclosure needs among firms); 
Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 12. Another solution to this contracting prob-
lem would be for a public company to commit to abide by the disclosure requirements of 
the stock exchange on which its shares are listed. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as 
Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1466-75 (1997). 
 15. Effects on the welfare of other firms from the disclosure of information by a firm, 
if the disclosing firm cannot capture them, are known as interfirm externalities. Interfirm 
externalities can be either positive or negative, depending on whether the disclosures bene-
fit or harm other firms. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 12 (arguing 
that interfirm externalities justify federal regulation of disclosure requirements); see also 
Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563 (2001) [herein-
after Fox, Issuer Choice] (responding to Romano’s objections to the interfirm externality 
justification for federal disclosure regulation). 
 16. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Dis-
closure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); see also William H. Beaver, The Nature of Man-
dated Disclosure, in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 317, 
320-21 (Richard A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980).  
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-
Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1759-60 (2002) (describing how the globalization of financial mar-
kets is accelerating); Joel Seligman, Götterdämmerung for the Securities Act?, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 887 (1997) (noting the increasing tendency of issuers to opt out of the U.S. securities 
regulation regime). 
 19. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1200 (1999) (considering whether U.S. securities registrants should be allowed to 
satisfy mandatory disclosure requirements by using International Accounting Standards); 
Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997) (considering how international securities regulation should 
be harmonized); Floyd Norris, Companies Pushed To Adopt International Audit Standards, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2004, at C6 (reporting on the SEC vote to encourage foreign compa-
nies to adopt international accounting standards). 
 20. Public equity markets in the United States experienced their largest percentage 
loss since the Great Depression during this period with a decline in value in excess of 





bankruptcies in 2002,21 including the notable bankruptcies of firms 
such as Enron and Worldcom, is facing heightened scrutiny. Public 
companies are questioning whether the substantial costs of comply-
ing with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in response to these col-
lapses, can be justified.22 But the appropriate scope and content of 
public company disclosure requirements cannot be determined with-
out first developing a method to evaluate when disclosure require-
ments are welfare-enhancing. 
 So the first step in answering the question of what, if any, infor-
mation public companies should be required to disclose is to construct 
a comprehensive model of the costs and benefits of disclosures by a 
public company. Previous scholarship has identified various costs 
and benefits triggered when disclosure requirements are imple-
mented; however, an integrated framework is notably absent. For ex-
ample, disclosure requirements trigger trade-offs similar to those im-
plicated when evaluating intellectual property protections because 
disclosure requirements eliminate the simplest form of intellectual 
property protection—keeping information secret.23 Requiring public 
companies to disclose information may diminish social welfare by re-
ducing incentives to invest in innovation.24 But no one, prior to this 
Article, has shown how to systematically consider this, as well as the 
many other costs and benefits of disclosure regulation, when evaluat-
ing public company disclosure requirements.  
 A legitimate argument for disclosure regulation must also specify 
when regulatory intervention is preferable to a market outcome. A 
sound justification for regulation should (1) identify a market failure, 
(2) measure the significance of that market failure, and (3) weigh the 
costs and benefits of undertaking a corrective regulatory interven-
tion. Existing scholarship is again helpful, but flawed. The potential 
                                                                                                                    
seven trillion dollars. Martin Zimmerman, 2002 Ends Mixed as Markets Register Third 
Year of Declines, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at C1. 
 21. Kathy M. Kristof, A Long, Sad Chapter 11 in History: Bankruptcies in 2002 Set 
Record, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at C1. 
 22. Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of Cor-
porate-Governance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at A1 (reporting the results of a sur-
vey finding substantial costs to public companies to implement the provisions of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act). 
 23. Anthony Kronman at Yale Law School makes a comparable point with respect to 
the connection between disclosure requirements and intellectual property protections when 
parties enter into a contract; he argues that the common law limits disclosure require-
ments in certain contractual settings to protect investments in information-gathering ac-
tivities. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); see also Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Informa-
tion Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1994) (providing a formal model supporting Kron-
man’s conclusion and adding as a consideration whether an investment in information-
generating activities does or does not produce socially useful information). 
 24. This is the primary trade-off economists have identified as relevant when evaluat-
ing intellectual property protections. See generally WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, 
GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT (1969). 
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harm from a market failure in public company disclosure practices is 
much greater than previously realized. Both proponents and oppo-
nents of federal disclosure regulation have estimated the potential 
harm from interfirm externalities by looking at the difference be-
tween the costs to a company from disclosing proprietary information 
and the gains to other firms from receiving the disclosed information. 
This focus on the net of the costs to the disclosing firm and the gains 
to third parties is intuitive, but incorrect. The better measure of the 
potential cost of an externality is provided by looking at the gross po-
tential gains to third parties that are not recognized by the company 
making disclosures, and in the case of interfirm externalities, these 
potential gains are quite substantial.25 It may well be that “reading 
public company financial statements is like reading tea leaves,”26 
largely as the result of a market failure. Of course, imposing a regu-
latory solution to address even a significant market failure will en-
gender its own set of costs, all of which must be properly considered. 
Such an analysis can only be carried out in the context of evaluating 
specific disclosure requirements. 
 Thus, the third step in determining what, if any, information pub-
lic companies should be required to disclose is to consider the efficacy 
of a specific disclosure requirement. The disclosure requirement 
evaluated here is a requirement that public companies disclose sub-
stantially more of the information generated within the firm to man-
age operations than currently is required to be disclosed.27 Informa-
tion subject to such a disclosure requirement would include both 
quantitative measures of a firm’s performance, such as the contribu-
tion to a firm’s profits from its various products, and qualitative 
measures of the firm’s performance, such as the level of customer 
satisfaction. Two reference points prove useful in evaluating this 
proposed disclosure requirement. First, the disclosure practices in 
transactions where information shared with investors is not made 
available to the general public provides an important benchmark. In 
these “private” transactions investors are, for the most part, provided 
substantially more internal management information than is dis-
closed to investors in public companies. Second, the disclosure re-
quirements currently imposed on public companies that have signifi-
                                                                                                                    
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. Interview with Catherine Sellman, Director of Research, Barrington Partners, in 
Santa Monica, Cal. (Jan. 14, 2004). 
 27. The primary existing requirement to disclose information generated within the 
firm to manage operations is the Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) disclo-
sure requirement of Regulation S-K. Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1996) (calling for 
“Management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations”). 
This narrative discussion of the company’s financial performance is required to consider 
“known trends” and “uncertainties” regarding its operations and short-term and long-term 
cash sources and uses. Id. § 229.303(a)(1)-(3). 





cant oil and gas exploration operations provide a useful example of 
how the type of expanded disclosure regulation under consideration 
here can be implemented.28 
 The analysis supports requiring public companies to disclose sub-
stantially more internal management information than they cur-
rently disclose. This finding also suggests that the SEC needs to 
change the way in which it develops mandatory disclosure require-
ments generally. Currently the SEC gives substantial weight to the 
concerns of public companies about the costs of disclosing proprietary 
information,29 but these are precisely the concerns that this Article 
shows are most likely to lead to a costly market failure. 
 This finding presents a challenge to those who argue that compa-
nies should be granted the right to choose the regime under which 
their securities are regulated. Legal scholars, most notably Profes-
sors Stephen Choi and Andrew T. Guzman at the Boalt Law School 
and Professor Roberta Romano at Yale Law School, have proposed 
that companies issuing securities be allowed to choose the regime 
under which their securities are regulated, just as corporations can 
elect their state of incorporation.30 These issuer-choice proponents 
argue that there is no valid justification for imposing federal disclo-
sure requirements on public companies, and their arguments are 
based on a fair reading of current scholarship. But the analysis in 
this Article shows that there may be, in fact, a legitimate basis for 
federal disclosure regulation. In the face of the findings here, the is-
suer-choice proponents need to show either that the federal govern-
ment cannot implement the disclosure requirements called for here 
or that the costs of imposing these requirements outweigh the sub-
stantial benefits identified. 
                                                                                                                    
 28. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4–10 (1999) (requiring disclosure of the estimated value of an is-
suer’s proven oil and gas reserves); see also Heather Timmons, Shell Reduces Estimate of 
Reserves Again, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2004, at C1 (describing how executives at Royal 
Dutch/Shell Group misled investors by overreporting reserves in violation of these disclo-
sure provisions). 
 29. See, e.g., Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(ii) (1999) (providing that an issuer is not 
required to disclose narrative information concerning new business lines and products “the 
disclosure of which would affect adversely the registrant’s competitive position”); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.406(b)(2)(iii) (1999) (granting issuers the right to seek confidential treatment from 
the SEC). See generally V. Gerard Comizio, Keeping Corporate Information Secret: Confi-
dential Treatment Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 787 (1983). Nor do public firms have an ongoing obligation to 
disclose material information. See Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a 
Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: “Are We There Yet?”, 
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 140-58 (1998) (describing when public companies do or do not 
have a “duty to speak”). 
 30. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 14; Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 
12; Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12. 
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II.   THE ECONOMICS OF DISCLOSURES BY A FIRM 
 The first step in answering the question of what, if any, informa-
tion public companies should be required to disclose is to develop a 
comprehensive model of the costs and benefits of disclosures by a 
public company. A number of eminent scholars have considered the 
economics of disclosures by a firm, including William H. Beaver at 
the Stanford Graduate School of Business,31 Judge Frank Easter-
brook and Daniel Fischel at the University of Chicago Law School,32 
Merritt Fox at Columbia Law School,33 and Edmund Kitch at the 
University of Virginia Law School,34 among others.35  
 However, this scholarship treats the economics of disclosures by a 
firm as a pedagogical matter, intended to provide a hypothetical 
regulator with a list of issues to be considered. In fact, a comprehen-
sive microeconomic analysis of disclosure actually can be used to de-
termine the efficacy of specific disclosure requirements, as shown by 
this Article. To address this shortcoming in the current scholarship 
on disclosure, it is useful to separate the costs and benefits of disclo-
sure into three categories: (1) costs and benefits realized whether or 
not a company has publicly traded securities, (2) costs and benefits 
realized only when a company has publicly traded securities,36 and 
(3) costs and benefits from disclosure that are not realized by the 
company making the disclosure (externalities).37  
 Before proceeding, a brief methodological clarification is in order. 
The objective here is to identify all of the significant costs and bene-
                                                                                                                    
 31. See WILLIAM H. BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN ACCOUNTING REVOLUTION 
185-205 (1981); Beaver, supra note 16, at 629, 642-44. 
 32. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 707-14. 
 33. See Fox, supra note 19, at 2532-52; Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra 
note 12, at 1345-46, 1356-68. 
 34. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 763, 773-76 (1995). 
 35. There is an extensive literature in financial economics scholarship considering 
public company disclosures. This scholarship has focused primarily on determining (1) the 
extent to which disclosures influence share prices, see Healy & Palepu, supra note 5; 
Robert W. Holthausen & Ross L. Watts, The Relevance of the Value-Relevance Literature 
for Financial Accounting Standard Setting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2001) (reviewing stud-
ies indicating which financial statement disclosures are relevant to a company’s share 
price), and (2) explaining the theoretical dynamics involved in selecting disclosure prac-
tices, see Ronald A. Dye, An Evaluation of “Essays on Disclosure” and the Disclosure Litera-
ture in Accounting, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON 181 (2001) (reviewing analytical models of firm 
disclosures); Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97 (2001) 
(reviewing analytical models of firm disclosures). 
 36. This category combines all types of public securities. Some of the costs and bene-
fits of disclosure may only be realized by firms that have publicly traded equity, or perhaps 
only by those firms that have publicly traded equity distributed in a way that allows inves-
tors to directly influence manager behavior. Such refinements are not necessary to advance 
the analysis here. 
 37. This classification proves useful when determining what inferences about efficient 
public company disclosure practices can be drawn from disclosure practices in private 
transactions. See infra Part IV.C.1. 





fits that could result from the disclosure of information by a com-
pany. Whether and to what extent a particular disclosure or disclo-
sure requirement triggers some or all of the costs and benefits identi-
fied is considered later.38 
A.   Benefits from Disclosures by a Firm 
 Scholarship on the economics of firm disclosure has identified 
numerous benefits from the disclosure of information by a firm, in-
cluding reduced agency costs, a lower cost of capital, improved liquid-
ity for the firm’s shares, and a number of benefits that a company 
making a disclosure may not fully capture. This scholarship is sum-
marized and supplemented here. The analysis starts with a consid-
eration of the benefits from disclosures that can be captured by a 
firm making a disclosure, whether or not that firm has publicly 
traded securities.  
1.   Benefits from Disclosures by Private or Public Firms 
 Reducing agency costs, the costs that arise from the separation of 
management and ownership in business organizations,39 is the pri-
mary benefit that firm disclosures provide whether or not a firm has 
publicly traded securities. Disclosures provide information that a 
firm’s investors can use to monitor the performance and behavior of 
the firm’s managers. As Fox explains, “[d]isclosure assists in the ef-
fective exercise of the shareholder franchise and in shareholder en-
forcement of management’s fiduciary duties.”40 The more information 
a company discloses, the more effectively investors can evaluate how 
well the company’s management is exploiting opportunities available 
to the firm.  
 One way to understand how increased disclosure can reduce 
agency costs is to consider what may result when disclosures are lim-
ited. In the absence of adequate disclosure, managers will focus on 
improving the limited set of their performance indicators that are ob-
servable by investors, even when improving these measures does not 
increase the value of the firm. The undue emphasis that managers at 
public firms place on reporting positive short-term financial results is 
one example of this cost. Public investors now rely primarily on 
summary financial results to monitor and reward manager perform-
ance. And, in turn, managers focus on improving these reported 
measures, even at the expense of creating value within the firm. Em-
                                                                                                                    
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 40. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 12, at 1364. 
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pirical41 and theoretical research,42 as well as anecdotal evidence,43 
suggests that the costs resulting from the opaqueness of summary fi-
nancial information are significant. With increased disclosure, inves-
tors do not have to rely as much on indirect signals of value creation. 
 Publicly disclosing information will also reduce the amount of in-
formation to which managers have exclusive access. Managers can 
benefit from access to a company’s undisclosed information at the ex-
pense of investors in several ways, even if the firm does not have 
public securities.44 For example, managers can harm a firm by bring-
ing this information with them to other companies. While much of 
the transfer of information in this way is prohibited,45 there is some 
amount of this information that is either not legally protected or for 
which such protection is not effective. The cost of information trans-
fers through labor markets may also be borne by a manager’s current 
employer. An employee who remains with the same company may 
hold her company hostage to the extent that she has a credible threat 
of bringing this information to a competitor. In either scenario, the 
disclosure of information by a firm could reduce potential agency 
costs resulting from the expropriation of information by the firm’s 
                                                                                                                    
 41. See, e.g., Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Managerial Competition, Information Costs, 
and Corporate Governance: The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Con-
tests, 10 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (1988) (finding that incumbent managers use accounting dis-
cretion to improve reported financial performance during a proxy fight). 
 42. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of 
Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655 (1989). 
 43. The scandals at companies such as Enron and Global Crossing revealed that com-
panies can and do enter into transactions that have a substantially greater impact on re-
ported financial performance than on the value of the firm. While some of the transactions 
undertaken by these companies were clearly illegal, the surprising conclusion was that 
many of these types of transactions, though entered into to improve reported financial re-
sults, may have been legal and in accordance with GAAP. See, e.g., Randall Smith, GAO 
Finds Hurdles to Linking Financial Firms to Fraud, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at C1. 
But see Deborah Solomon & Randall Smith, SEC Accuses Merrill of Fraud in Enron Deal, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2003, at C1. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt observed:  
For instance, many CEOs were paying more attention to managing their share 
price than to managing their business. Companies technically were following 
accounting rules, while in reality revealing as little as possible about their ac-
tual performance. The supposedly independent accounting firms were working 
hand in hand with corporate clients to try to water down accounting standards. 
When that wasn’t enough, they were willing accomplices—helping companies 
disguise the true story behind the numbers. 
ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA 
DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 8 (2002); see also ALEX BERENSON, THE NUMBER: HOW THE 
DRIVE FOR QUARTERLY EARNINGS CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA 
(2003). 
 44. For a discussion of additional costs from managers’ exclusive access to information 
when a firm does have public securities, see infra notes 52 to 54 and accompanying text. 
 45. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1B, at 1-3 to 1-4. 





managers.46 Disclosure requirements may also deter fraud, as sug-
gested by Brandeis, as long as there is a reliable mechanism in place 
to insure accurate and complete disclosure.47 
 2.   Benefits from Disclosures by Public Firms 
 There are additional agency cost savings from disclosures that 
may be realized when a firm has publicly traded securities. For one, 
increased disclosure by companies with public securities may facili-
tate the workings of the market for corporate control, which can re-
duce agency costs.48 A potential acquirer can use disclosed informa-
tion to refine her evaluation of the gains she could realize from an 
acquisition and to assist in arranging outside funding for the acquisi-
tion, if necessary. One example of how enhanced disclosure can im-
prove corporate control markets is the way additional disclosure re-
quirements imposed on companies with oil and gas exploration op-
erations, starting in 1978,49 facilitated the increase in hostile take-
over activity in this industry sector, beginning in the early 1980s.50  
Disclosures also improve share price accuracy.51 Improved share 
price accuracy reduces agency costs by providing investors a more re-
liable indicator of manager performance, and a more efficient means 
to reward value creation within the firm. With improved share price 
accuracy, insiders also have fewer opportunities to trade profitably in 
their company’s securities.52 This method of “expropriating” a public 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Of course, publicly disclosing such information may also be costly to the firm, as 
discussed infra Part II.B. 
 47. See BRANDEIS, supra note 7. 
 48. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transac-
tions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705 (1982) (“Corporate control transactions can reduce agency 
costs if better managers obtain control of the firm’s assets or if they alter the incentive 
structure facing existing managers. Corporate takeovers, and subsequent changes in man-
agement, increase the wealth of investors.”). 
 49. See supra note 28. 
 50. The author used this newly disclosed financial information when working as an 
investment banker on several of these transactions. 
 51. Share price accuracy refers to the extent to which share prices provide a reliable 
indicator of the underlying value of a firm’s assets. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985). The extent to which share price accuracy improves with in-
creased disclosure is difficult to calculate because a company’s “true” value is not directly 
observable. This limits the inferences that can be drawn from the numerous studies that 
show that disclosures do have an impact on a company’s stock price. See, e.g., Healy & 
Palepu, supra note 5; Holthausen & Watts, supra note 35. 
 52. See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 
J.L. & ECON. 149, 158–67 (1992) (showing that insiders generate abnormal positive re-
turns from trading in their own company’s stock). See generally Jesse M. Fried, Reducing 
the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 303, 321-22 (1998) (citing several empirical studies showing that insiders earn sig-
nificant returns through insider trading and hypothesizing that “the most plausible expla-
nation for this result is that insiders are trading on information that is not available to the 
rest of the market”). 
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firm’s information by a firm’s agents is generally considered contrary 
to the firm’s interest,53 as evidenced by insider-trading restrictions.54 
In addition to reducing agency costs, there are other benefits from 
increasing the accuracy of share prices. Ian Ayres at Yale Law School 
has shown how improving share price accuracy benefits a firm’s 
shareholders by reducing uncertainty when a shareholder wants to 
sell shares.55 Increased disclosure by a firm can also lower a firm’s 
cost of raising capital and improve the trading liquidity for the firm’s 
securities.56 
3.   Benefits from Disclosures Not Captured by the Disclosing Firm 
 There are several benefits from the disclosure of information that 
the firm making the disclosure may not be able to fully capture. Le-
gal scholars have identified these disclosure externalities in their at-
tempts to show that market failures justify federal disclosure regula-
tion. These externalities can be categorized based on the different 
third-party beneficiaries identified, including (1) a company’s com-
petitors, who may benefit from the disclosure of proprietary informa-
tion (interfirm externalities), (2) the economy as a whole, which could 
benefit from an improved allocation of assets, and (3) investors, some 
of whom may use disclosed information despite not owning shares in 
the disclosing firm. Each category of externalities is now considered 
in turn. 
Professor Fox is the leading proponent of the argument that com-
panies disclosing proprietary information are not able to capture the 
benefits their disclosures provide to the company’s “competitors, ma-
jor suppliers and major customers.”57 Fox argues that companies dis-
close less of this proprietary information than would be socially opti-
mal because of these interfirm externalities.58 Fox is correct that 
companies do not internalize all of the effects their disclosures have 
on their competitors, and so there is an externality at play.59 Fox does 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Fried, supra note 52, at 306-08 (summarizing the arguments for why insider trad-
ing should be prohibited). 
 54. Id. at 308-10 (summarizing the “system of rules designed to reduce the profits 
from [insider] trading”). 
 55. Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 
VA. L. REV. 945, 987-92 (1991) (modeling the benefit to selling shareholders from improved 
share price accuracy). 
 56. See Healy & Palepu, supra note 5, at 429-31 (summarizing theoretical arguments 
for and empirical evidence of the connection between enhanced disclosure, improved stock 
liquidity, and a lower cost of capital). 
 57. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 12, at 1345. For narrative sim-
plicity I refer to these three potential beneficiaries collectively as the “company’s competi-
tors” throughout the rest of this Article. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 
697-98 (noting that firm externalities may justify federal disclosure regulation). 
 58. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 12, at 1339.  
 59. See infra Part III.A. 





not, however, provide a convincing argument that these interfirm ef-
fects are always positive or that this externality can or should be rec-
tified through regulatory intervention.60 
Public company disclosures may also benefit the economy as a 
whole in ways that are not fully realized by the firm making the dis-
closures. For example, investors and managers at other firms might 
use public company valuations to decide whether to commit resources 
to business opportunities similar to those of highly-valued public 
companies. There are two steps to the argument that disclosures pro-
duce an externality by improving the allocation of assets throughout 
the economy. The first step is that increased disclosure improves the 
accuracy of share prices.61 The second step is that more accurate 
share prices lead to more efficient asset allocation throughout the 
economy in ways that are not captured by the firm making such dis-
closures.62 While each step in this argument is reasonable, it proves 
difficult to quantify the scale of either of these effects.63 Arguments 
that relate asset allocation in the economy with public company dis-
closure requirements are, at best, anecdotal.64 
Finally, commentators have offered several arguments as to why 
there is a market failure with respect to the production of useful in-
formation to investors.65 One argument is that without regulatory in-
                                                                                                                    
 60. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text. 
 61. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Stock Market and In-
vestment: Is the Market a Sideshow?, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 157 
(1990); see also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock 
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992) (analyzing the costs of various inaccuracies in share 
prices); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of 
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988) (arguing that 
efficient stock markets do not have a significant effect on economic productivity).  
 63. The decline in technology equity values in the United States after March 2000 
provides an anecdotal way to explore this effect. In 1999 and 2000, substantial funds were 
invested in the Internet and telecommunications industries, investments that were moti-
vated in large part by the public market valuations of companies operating in these sec-
tors. These investments now appear to be somewhere between ill-advised and wasteful. 
While the extent to which real investment activity appeared to be driven by public com-
pany valuations during this period was striking, this observation is of little evidentiary 
value. On one hand, if these valuations were the result of irrational exuberance, the disclo-
sure of additional information may not have altered these valuations. On the other hand, if 
these valuations were rational at the time, increased disclosure should not have systemati-
cally impacted these valuations.  
 64. The improved asset allocation rationale for regulatory intervention also fails to 
provide guidance as to what the content of disclosure requirements should be. The objec-
tive of improving asset allocation in the economy would suggest that public companies dis-
close information that would make share prices more accurate, but this objective provides 
no added insight on how to weigh the costs of disclosure against these benefits. 
 65. There is also a related line of arguments based on the observation that the firm 
may be the low-cost producer of firm-specific information, and so the firm should produce 
and distribute this information rather than investors. But this is not an externality argu-
ment, and so it is not included here. See Douglas W. Diamond, Optimal Release of Informa-
tion by Firms, 40 J. FIN. 1071 (1985); see also, Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 684 
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tervention, information about the firm will be overproduced because 
investors will expend resources to gain an advantage over other in-
vestors, such expenditures in “foreknowledge” do not increase social 
welfare.66 Another argument, whose leading proponent is John Coffee 
at Columbia Law School, points to the fact some investors benefit 
from information disclosed by the firm, without bearing the cost of 
generating this information, if they do not own that company’s secu-
rities.67 This public goods problem could lead to the underproduction 
of information about the firm. 
While both the social waste and public goods arguments suggest 
that the firm should disclose additional information to ameliorate a 
market failure, these arguments also suggest that increased disclo-
sure will have the opposite effects on the total amount of information 
produced about the firm. Because it is difficult to determine the scale 
of the social waste or public goods effects, it is not clear in what di-
rection the combination of these two effects will point.68 It may be 
that without any regulatory intervention, the overproduction of in-
formation by investors attempting to “beat the market” is just enough 
to offset the underproduction of information that results from the 
public goods nature of this information. Because of this uncertainty, 
the impact of disclosure on the production of information for inves-
tors is not included as an economic benefit of disclosure here.69 
4.   Insights from Intellectual Property Economics 
Benefits implicit in the relationship between disclosure require-
ments and intellectual property protections also need to be included 
as a potential gain from disclosure. Information held within a com-
                                                                                                                    
(“[F]or most information about a firm, the firm itself can create and distribute the knowl-
edge at less cost than the shareholders . . . .”). 
 66. See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward 
to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 565-66 (1971). 
 67. See Coffee, supra note 16, at 732; see also Beaver, supra note 16, at 626-28. 
 68. Coffee undertakes a valiant effort to make this calculation and suggests that the 
problem of underproduction of information, as compared with overproduction of informa-
tion, is probably greater, at least in the context of companies that are not “covered” by Wall 
Street analysts. Coffee, supra note 16, at 731-32. But see Beaver, supra note 16, at 636 
(noting that the “tendency for an excessive amount of information” to be produced has “the 
converse [implication] of the public good argument which implies an inadequate amount of 
disclosure”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 681-82; Romano, Empowering Inves-
tors, supra note 12, at 2367 n.20 (“The economic theory underlying the argument concern-
ing information production is ambiguous, however: Capital markets can overproduce in-
formation as well as underproduce it.”). 
 69. Even if the underproduction of information about the firm were accepted as a ba-
sis for regulatory intervention, it is unclear what guidance this argument would provide as 
to what information should be subject to public company disclosure requirements. The 
logical implication would be that the firm should produce more information that is useful 
to investors. But such a recommendation provides little guidance as to how to balance the 
costs of disclosure with its usefulness to those who do not own the firm’s securities. 





pany can create monopoly power for the firm, comparable to the mo-
nopoly power conferred under intellectual property law.70 Disclosures 
can reduce a firm’s monopoly power, which could lead to a gain in 
consumer welfare.71 A simple example illustrates this potential bene-
fit. Consider the consequences of eliminating the de jure protection 
provided by intellectual property rights rather than reducing the de 
facto protection provided by nondisclosure. There would be a welfare 
gain as companies would no longer be able to charge premia for pat-
ented products or copyrighted materials. Of course, there would be 
costs as the incentives to invest in creating patented products or 
copyrighted materials are reduced. These costs, considered sepa-
rately, are discussed below.72 
   B.    Costs of Disclosures by a Firm 
 As with the benefits from disclosure, the costs from the disclosure 
of information by a firm can be separated into three categories: (1) 
those costs incurred whether or not a company has publicly traded 
securities, (2) those costs incurred when a company has publicly 
traded securities,73 and (3) the costs that disclosure may impose on 
parties other than the firm making the disclosure. 
1.   Costs of Disclosure for Private or Public Firms 
 Some of the costs of disclosure are incurred whether or not the in-
formation disclosed is made available to the public.74 The primary 
production cost is the “direct” cost of preparing and disseminating in-
formation about the firm.75 While disclosure production costs are in-
                                                                                                                    
 70. The essential difference is that in the case of undisclosed information the protec-
tion is de facto, provided simply by maintaining secrecy, while in the case of intellectual 
property law the protection is provided de jure. 
 71. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 21-29 (3d ed. 1990) (describing how reducing monopoly power 
increases social welfare). 
 72. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
 73. It is assumed for expository simplicity that information disclosed by a firm gener-
ally will be made available to the public if, and only if, the firm has publicly traded securi-
ties. It is also assumed that information cannot be selectively disclosed by public firms to 
some members of the public but not others. This is consistent with the requirements of 
Regulation FD. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2000) (restricting the ability of public firms to 
selectively disclose nonpublic material information to certain market participants); see 
Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
533, 537-40 (2002) (describing the operation of Regulation FD). 
 74. The distinction here between private disclosure and public disclosure is necessar-
ily one of degree, since even a private disclosure involves sharing information with parties 
who may be outside the firm. 
 75. This distinction follows Beaver, supra note 16, at 629 (distinguishing between the 
direct costs of disclosure which “include the costs of the production, certification, dissemi-
nation, and interpretation of disclosures,” and the indirect costs of disclosure which “in-
clude the adverse effects of disclosure on competitive advantage”), and Fox, Retaining 
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curred whether or not a firm has publicly traded securities, such 
costs will usually be greater for firms with publicly traded securities 
for several reasons. First, public companies typically have a larger 
number of shareholders to whom materials need to be distributed. 
Second, heightened diligence is usually applied in preparing materi-
als when a firm has publicly traded securities because of the risk of 
revealing competitively disadvantaging information and because of 
increased concerns about liability.76 
2.   Costs of Disclosure for Public Firms 
 Some of the costs of disclosure result primarily from providing 
the public-at-large access to the information disclosed by the firm. 
The primary “publication cost”77 is the competitive disadvantage that 
may result when a firm discloses proprietary information. The exam-
ple typically offered of such a publication cost is the entry of competi-
tors when it is disclosed that a certain business is particularly profit-
able.78 With new entrants, the firm making the disclosure is likely to 
see profits decline. 
 Two other publication costs that scholars have identified, litiga-
tion costs79 and the risk that increased disclosures facilitate anticom-
petitive behavior,80 are not included in the microeconomic model of 
disclosure offered here. Litigation costs are not included here because 
it is unclear as a practical or theoretical matter that increased disclo-
sure leads to increased litigation costs. One could imagine a system 
where even inaccurate disclosures create a safe harbor from litigation 
or, perhaps, substantial protection from litigation risks resulting 
from such disclosures. For example, the SEC granted such protection 
for forward-looking statements starting in 1978, as long as “meaning-
ful cautionary statements” were also provided.81 In such circum-
stances, increased disclosure could reduce rather than increase liti-
gation costs. As for the risk of facilitating anticompetitive activity, 
there is little evidence available to address this issue.  
3.   Costs of Disclosure Imposed on Other Firms 
 Publication costs can also fall on companies other than the firm 
                                                                                                                    
Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 12, at 1345 (distinguishing between “operational” costs 
of disclosure and “interfirm” costs of disclosure). 
 76. See Kitch, supra note 34, at 770-72. 
 77. Instead of the term “publication costs”, Beaver, supra note 16, at 629, defines 
these costs as the “indirect costs” of disclosure, and Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, 
supra note 12, at 1345, uses the term “interfirm” costs. 
 78. See infra note 136 and accompanying text; Beaver, supra note 16, at 627. 
 79. See Kitch, supra note 34, at 770-72. 
 80. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 389. 
 81. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1999). 





making a disclosure. A simple example illustrates this possibility.82 
Suppose that before any disclosures are made, two firms have infor-
mation that provides these firms an unassailable competitive advan-
tage, and that they jointly exploit this advantage in an oligopolistic 
fashion. Now suppose that one of these firms is required to disclose 
this information. The public dissemination of this information would 
reduce the competitive advantage previously shared by these firms, 
and so would reduce the profits of both the disclosing firm and the 
other firm. Of course, despite the harm to both the disclosing firm 
and its competitor in this situation, the disclosure could be welfare-
enhancing, because of the economic gains that result from reducing 
monopoly power.83 
 Publication costs may also fall more broadly. The economic analy-
sis of intellectual property rights helps to clarify the impact that dis-
closure requirements can have on investment decisions. A company 
that knows that it may be required to disclose proprietary informa-
tion in the future will reduce its estimate of the returns that it ex-
pects to receive from investments in gathering this information. This, 
in turn, will reduce investments in innovation.  
 There is, however, an important caveat here. There are many 
ways by which competitors gain access to competitive information 
other than through public disclosure filings. Much of the information 
within a firm is at some point manifested in public behavior, such as 
the building of a new factory or the release of a new product. In addi-
tion, industrial espionage is a large industry.84 Finally, information 
transfers between firms can be carried out through labor markets 
without public disclosure.85  
It was an acknowledgement of the fact that companies might al-
ready have access to much of their competitors’ proprietary informa-
tion that kept legislators from including a competitive-harm exemp-
tion in the disclosure requirements of the original Securities Act.86 In 
1933 testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency in support of what was to become the Securities Act, Thomas 
Cochran, one of the proponents of the legislation, explained: 
                                                                                                                    
 82. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 397-98, 431-35 (providing 
other examples of how disclosures by one firm may harm another firm). But see Fox, Issuer 
Choice, supra note 15, at 575-80 (challenging the validity of the examples Romano offers). 
 83. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 71, at 21-29. Because there are other costs and 
benefits involved in making a disclosure, it is not possible to ascertain that such a disclo-
sure would be welfare-enhancing in this hypothetical. 
 84. The estimated size of the industrial espionage industry in 2001 was $2 billion. 
The Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, Frequently Asked Questions at 
http://www.scip.org/ci/faq.asp (last visited July 4, 2004). 
 85. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
 86. On the other hand, the Exchange Act did provide an explicit exemption from dis-
closure for trade secrets, § 24(c) ch. 404, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2001). 
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Parenthetically, every one who has ever dealt with industrial en-
gineers knows that the system of commercial espionage that exists 
at the present time in the United States is so perfect that normally 
the directors of a corporation know much more about their com-
petitors’ business than they do even about their own . . . .87 
While this conclusion is certainly too strong, it is also true that given 
the extent of competitive knowledge available in other ways, the dis-
incentive to invest caused by a disclosure requirement may not be as 
large as one might, at first, believe. 
C.   Summary of the Costs and Benefits from Disclosures by a Firm 
 The costs and benefits of disclosures by a firm are summarized in 
Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 
Benefits from Disclosure Costs of Disclosure 
Private and Public Firms: 
• Reduced agency costs:  im-
proved monitoring of       
managers. 
 
Private and Public Firms: 
• Direct costs of preparing 
and disseminating informa-
tion about the firm. 
 
Public Firms Only: 
• Reduced agency costs:  fa-
cilitate corporate control  
market; fewer insider trad-
ing opportunities. 
• More accurate share prices. 
• Lower cost of capital. 
• Improved liquidity. 
 
Public Firms Only: 
• Competitive disadvantaging. 
  
Gains Realized by Third-Parties: 
• Competitor gains. 
• Improved economy-wide as-
set allocation. 
• Consumer surplus gains. 
Costs Imposed on Third-Parties: 
• Competitors may lose oli-
gopoly-pricing power. 
• Disincentive to invest in in-
novation. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 87. Stock Exchange Practices, Part 15: National Securities Exchange Act 1934, Hear-
ings on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong. and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6533 (1934), reprinted in 6 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
ACT OF 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen Mahar eds., 1973). 





1. Inadequacy of Sweeping Claims About the Efficacy of 
Disclosure Requirements 
 This summary of the economics of the disclosure of information by 
public companies suggests how difficult it would be to reach a sweep-
ing conclusion about the efficacy of federal disclosure regulation. A 
generic argument for imposing disclosure requirements on public 
companies is unlikely to be able to address the numerous trade-offs 
identified here.88 For example, the argument that Fox offers for man-
datory disclosure regulation based on interfirm externalities cannot 
withstand the scrutiny suggested by the delineation of the costs and 
benefits of disclosure regulation provided here. Fox claims that man-
datory public company disclosure regulations are welfare-enhancing, 
because a company disclosing “competitively disadvantaging” infor-
mation is not able to capture the benefits these disclosures create for 
its competitors.89 Fox’s argument can be separated into two compo-
nents: (1) interfirm externalities cause a market failure in disclosure 
practices, and (2) federal disclosure regulation is an appropriate 
method to address this market failure. 
 It is the second component of Fox’s argument, namely that federal 
disclosure regulation can be justified by a market failure resulting 
from interfirm externalities in disclosure practices, that is rejected 
here.90 Let us assume that interfirm externalities do lead to a market 
failure.91 The issue here is whether Fox is able to justify mandatory 
disclosure regulation as an appropriate response to this market fail-
ure without evaluating the efficacy of specific disclosure require-
ments. 
 Romano has identified several shortcomings in this second com-
ponent of Fox’s argument.92 First, Romano points out that Fox’s call 
                                                                                                                    
 88. This is consistent with the conclusion that Romano reaches from her review of fi-
nancial economics models of disclosure regulation and interfirm externalities: 
There is, accordingly, one conclusion that can be drawn assuredly from the re-
sults of the two models of disclosure policy in the context of interfirm external-
ities, and this is the reason for reviewing the models in considerable detail: it is 
inappropriate to assert with any appreciable confidence, particularly the cer-
tainty that Fox conveys, that government intervention to mandate disclosure in 
order to remedy interfirm externalities will always maximize social welfare. 
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 439. 
 89. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 12; and Fox, Issuer Choice, 
supra note 15. 
 90. The first claim, that interfirm externalities lead to a market failure in public com-
pany disclosure practices, is considered below, see infra Part III.A. The second claim, that 
the SEC imposes disclosure requirements to address interfirm externalities, is considered 
further below, see infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.  
 91. See infra Part III.A. (supporting this conclusion). 
 92. Another criticism of this component of Fox’s argument is offered by Franco, supra 
note 10, at 346-48 (arguing that Fox’s interfirm externality argument fails to provide guid-
ance as to what specific types of information should be subject to mandatory disclosure re-
quirements). 
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for regulation does not include a consideration of the costs of regula-
tory intervention.93 As Romano explains: “Fox has committed a com-
mon fallacy of disclosure market-failure proponents, which . . . occurs 
because the proponents assume that the government alternative 
achieves the optimal output without examining that government al-
ternative as closely as they scrutinize market outcomes.”94 Second, 
Romano raises the possibility that the disclosure of information by a 
firm may have an adverse, as well as a positive, impact on other 
firms.95 Romano argues that this possibility suggests that a more re-
fined analysis is necessary before recommending regulatory inter-
vention.96 To support this claim, Romano points to several analytic 
models of disclosure practices that suggest that mandatory disclosure 
regulation need not increase social welfare, even in the presence of 
interfirm externalities.97 
 The microeconomic model of disclosure developed here provides a 
simpler explanation of why Fox’s argument fails. Fox ignores the cost 
of disclosure that the comparison with the economics of intellectual 
property protections highlights, namely the effect disclosure re-
quirements can have on returns to investments in information-
                                                                                                                    
 93. More accurately, in this context, the question is the cost of establishing a regula-
tory monopoly, as compared with the cost of the federalist approach to securities regulation 
that Romano proposes. 
 94. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 439. 
 95. See id. at 431-35, 555-62. 
 96. See also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26 (1982) (“[T]he [exter-
nalities] rationale, if it is to be intellectually useful, should be confined to instances where 
the spillover is large, fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable.”). Fox counters that positive 
interfirm externalities are much more likely than negative interfirm externalities: “[T]here 
are overwhelming reasons to believe that for any item of issuer information that is rele-
vant to this debate, its disclosure is likely to have a positive effect on one or more of the 
other firms in the economy and will have a negative effect on none.” Fox, Issuer Choice, su-
pra note 15, at 569. Based on this, Fox concludes that his recommendation is valid even if, 
in some odd circumstances, there may be negative interfirm externalities. 
 97. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 439. Romano, however, goes 
on to conclude too much from Fox’s failure. Romano argues that it would be impossible to 
develop any mandatory disclosure requirements in order to address interfirm externalities. 
Romano’s concern is with how “a government regulator would be able to make this labori-
ous calculation for each piece of information for each firm.” Id. at 435. But Romano’s de-
scription of the challenge facing a regulator ignores an alternative approach, namely ap-
plying disclosure requirements to certain classes of information. By analogy, when deter-
mining the scope and duration of intellectual property protections, the government under-
takes an estimate of the trade-offs between granting monopoly power and increasing in-
centives to invest in innovation based on the category of information involved. Fox’s argu-
ment, in this context, is akin to concluding that because there are benefits from intellec-
tual property protections, it is necessarily true that intellectual property should be pro-
tected. This is certainly too broad a conclusion. But the opposite is not necessarily true ei-
ther. Simply because intellectual property protections cannot be justified without including 
more nuanced considerations, one should not conclude that intellectual property protec-
tions should never be granted. See infra Part IV (providing an example of the type of 
analysis that Romano’s conclusion overlooks). 





gathering activities.98 Even if interfirm externalities are always posi-
tive, it is still impossible to know a priori how these benefits might 
compare with the costs of reducing returns on innovation from im-
plementing disclosure requirements.  
 A simple example shows how problematic these trade-offs are for 
the broad conclusion that Fox wants to reach. Suppose public compa-
nies were required to disclose all of their trade secrets. Such a disclo-
sure requirement would likely benefit a firm’s competitors. Fox’s 
analysis provides no basis for rejecting such a disclosure require-
ment. But should the disclosure of all trade secrets be required? Such 
a recommendation cannot be evaluated without also considering the 
effect such a requirement would have on investments in innovation. 
 It is ironic that Fox should make this error; he is one of the few 
scholars who even mention the potential ramifications of disclosure 
policies on investment decisions.99 Fox addresses this inconsistency 
in a footnote in which he explains, “disclosure’s impacts on both 
static and dynamic efficiency are incidental effects outside of the or-
dinary domain of financial economics, and how they balance out is 
something that a country’s governmental authorities should de-
cide.”100 But this is not convincing. Is it reasonable for a scholar to ig-
nore the costs of reducing incentives to invest in innovation when 
recommending disclosure requirements because such considerations 
are “outside the ordinary domain of financial economics?” What rele-
vant information is the regulator presumed to have access to that the 
scholar does not? A better way to proceed is to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of imposing specific disclosure requirements.   
2.   Redistributive Effects of Public Firm Disclosures 
Disclosure requirements may also have significant redistributive 
effects. Companies that do not have to make public disclosures may 
benefit from increased disclosures by U.S. public companies without 
incurring commensurate disclosure costs. This could put U.S. public 
companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to private firms, 
many foreign firms, and, in some cases, larger firms.101 But the sig-
nificance of these redistributive effects is not obvious. First, this 
question needs to be understood in a broader context. United States 
capital markets have put a premium on maintaining high levels of 
                                                                                                                    
 98. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
 99. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 12, at 1346 n.20; see also Fran-
co, supra note 10, at 347 n.256. 
 100. Fox, Issuer Choice, supra note 15, at 574 n.29. 
 101. Under the current implementation of the materiality standard, smaller firms may 
be required to disclose more detailed information than a larger firm would be required to 
disclose. 
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disclosure in public capital markets,102 and this approach may be one 
factor in the success of U.S. capital markets.103 While there are dis-
closure costs imposed on U.S. public companies, there are benefits as 
well. The conclusion that increased disclosure will inevitably hurt 
U.S. public companies is too simplistic.  
 There also are adjustments to the current disclosure regime that 
could alter these redistributive costs. First, the demarcation line be-
tween public and private companies could be adjusted.104 Second, 
comparable disclosure requirements could be implemented interna-
tionally. The feasibility or desirability of those changes is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but either of those adjustments could reduce the 
redistributive effects of imposing disclosure requirements on U.S. 
public companies. 
III.   THE REGULATION OF DISCLOSURES BY PUBLIC COMPANIES 
 With an understanding of the costs and benefits of public com-
pany disclosures in place, the next step in determining what informa-
tion a public company should be required to disclose is to specify the 
circumstances under which regulatory intervention into the disclo-
sure practices of public companies could make sense. A sound justifi-
cation for regulation should: (1) identify a market failure; (2) evalu-
ate the significance of that market failure; and (3) weigh the costs 
and benefits of undertaking a corrective regulatory intervention.105 
This Section addresses each of these issues in turn. First, the exis-
tence of a market failure in public company disclosure practices re-
sulting from interfirm externalities is confirmed. Second, the poten-
tial costs of this market failure are shown to be much more substan-
tial than previously realized. Third, a calculation is provided to 
evaluate when a regulatory intervention to correct this market fail-
ure would make sense. 
                                                                                                                    
 102. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Except perhaps for a bias towards pro-
tecting corporations’ interests over investors’ interests. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Sub-
ordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 27, 89 (1990); MARK ROE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 
(1994). 
 103. Note, for example, that some foreign firms elect to register securities in the 
United States, despite the fact that U.S. securities disclosure requirements are more ex-
pansive than those elsewhere. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 1779-1800 (discussing the eco-
nomic motivations for this type of “cross-listing”). 
 104. See Seligman, supra note 18, at 889 (describing the current basis for differentiat-
ing between private and public offerings). 
 105. For a similar set of criteria, see, for example, Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives 
on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1253 (R. 
Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). 





A.   Interfirm Externalities in the Disclosure Practices of Public 
Companies 
 Concerns about the competitive harm that may result from dis-
closures do cause a significant market failure in the disclosure prac-
tices of public companies. As noted above, Fox’s argument for regula-
tory intervention based on interfirm externalities can be separated 
into two claims: (1) that interfirm externalities lead to a market fail-
ure in disclosure practices; and (2) that federal disclosure regulation 
is an appropriate method to address this market failure.106 It was 
shown above that the argument that Fox uses to justify mandatory 
public company disclosure requirements based on interfirm external-
ities, the second component of his argument, is overbroad.107 More-
over, current U.S. public company disclosure requirements are too 
limited in some respects and too broad in other respects to be under-
stood solely as an effort to correct a market failure resulting from in-
terfirm externalities. If the objective of U.S. disclosure requirements 
were to address interfirm externalities, then there should not be ex-
emptions explicitly granted to allow companies to avoid disclosing 
proprietary information, but there are.108 Nor can an interfirm exter-
nality rationale explain requirements, for example, that companies 
disclose the details of transactions between a firm and its agents, 
since this information is unlikely to be of value to a firm’s competi-
tors.109  
 However, the first component of Fox’s argument, that interfirm 
externalities lead to a market failure, is correct, with much evidence 
to support it. That said, the particular evidence that Fox offers to 
support the conclusion that interfirm externalities lead to a market 
failure is problematic. Fox appears to rely primarily on the fact that 
the information disclosed by one firm is provided at no cost to other 
firms,110 but as shown above, this does not eliminate the possibility of 
disclosures imposing costs, as well as benefits, on other firms.111  
 A more convincing argument that there is a market failure in 
public company disclosure practices as a result of interfirm external-
ities would show (1) that companies have difficulty capturing all the 
benefits that their disclosures provide to competitors, and (2) that 
concerns about releasing competitively disadvantaging information 
substantially reduce public company disclosures. If firms were able to 
                                                                                                                    
 106. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.  
 108. See supra note 29. 
 109. Such a requirement is better explained by the usefulness of disclosure of this in-
formation in terms of reduced agency costs. See Mahoney, supra note 13. 
 110. Fox, Issuer Choice, supra note 15, at 571 n.25 (“The value of information, which in 
this case is received for free . . . .”). 
 111. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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capture the benefits their disclosures provided to third parties, then 
there would not be evidence of a market failure. If firms did not alter 
their disclosure practices to avoid disclosing proprietary information, 
then, even if there were a market failure, it would probably not be 
significant. But both of these effects are evident, and so there does 
appear to be a substantial market failure in public company disclo-
sure practices resulting from interfirm externalities.  
1.   Evidence that All Competitor Gains Are Not Captured by a 
Disclosing Firm 
 To ascertain that there is a market failure, it must be shown that 
there is no effective way for companies making disclosures to capture 
all of the benefits that their disclosures provide competitors. While 
there are some circumstances in which a company can capture the 
benefits their disclosures provide to other firms, such as licensing ar-
rangements or the sale of customer lists,112 the idiosyncratic nature of 
these arrangements illustrates just how difficult it is for companies 
to capture such benefits generally. For example, firms sell customer 
lists to their competitors, but also include several “dummy” listings 
that send materials back to the owner of the list under an alias. By 
including these aliases, the owner of the list can inexpensively and 
accurately monitor how frequently the list is used. 
 In most circumstances, there are severe constraints on the ability 
of companies to capture the benefits generated by disclosing competi-
tively valuable information. First, it may be difficult to identify who 
the beneficiaries of such disclosures might be. The disclosure of an 
attractive business opportunity may bring into a market companies 
that were not previously competitors in that arena.113 Second, the in-
terested parties to those transactions, when they do know each other, 
are likely to be business competitors who face both legal114 and prac-
tical115 hurdles to cooperation. Third, when disclosures reduce a com-
pany’s monopoly power, the benefits from disclosure are provided in 
the form of gains in consumer surplus.116 Such gains are particularly 
difficult to monetize.117 Fourth, it is more difficult to create a market 
                                                                                                                    
 112. George Foster, Externalities and Financial Reporting, 35 J. FIN. 521, 526 (1980) 
(providing these as examples of situations where firms can capture benefits their disclo-
sures provide to competitors). 
 113. It should be noted that some form of public auction could ameliorate this particu-
lar difficulty in the absence of the other obstacles identified, but this is a complicating fac-
tor. 
 114. For example, such cooperation among competitors can raise antitrust concerns. 
See generally STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW (1993). 
 115. In many industries there is a fair degree of competitiveness and animosity be-
tween business competitors. 
 116. See supra Part II. 
 117. The possibility that disclosure requirements may provide benefits in terms of in-
creased consumer welfare is also problematic for an elegant market-based solution that 





for information than for other products or services because it is rela-
tively inexpensive to reproduce and distribute information broadly, 
and much of the value of information can only be determined after it 
has been provided to the potential purchaser.118 Finally, it is often 
difficult to monitor the use of information within another firm, which 
is how much proprietary information would be used. 
2.   Significance of Concerns About Disclosing Proprietary 
Information 
 If competitively disadvantaging information were not withheld, 
then the presence of a market failure in this context would be of little 
practical significance. But both empirical and theoretical research on 
public company disclosure practices suggest that concerns about the 
disclosure of proprietary information significantly reduce the amount 
of information that public companies choose to disclose.  
(a)   Empirical Findings Relating to Competitive-Disadvantaging 
Concerns 
 Two different lines of empirical analysis suggest that concerns 
about competitive disadvantaging are a significant factor in limiting 
disclosures by public companies. First are findings from studies of 
the information that sophisticated investors use to value companies. 
If public companies disclose most of the information that sophisti-
cated investors use to value public companies, then the presence of a 
market failure resulting from interfirm externalities would be of lit-
tle significance. Several studies were conducted throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s to determine what information sophisticated investors use 
                                                                                                                    
Romano suggests may help to overcome disclosure externalities. Romano points to the fact 
that many large investors hold shares in numerous companies, and so these investors will 
recognize both the costs to the disclosing firm and some of the benefits such disclosure 
would provide to other firms. Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 12, at 2368. 
Romano explains: 
The majority of investors hold portfolios, not single shares of stock, and there-
fore, unlike the issuer, they will internalize the externality if they make the 
disclosure decision. That is, they will desire a regime requiring the informa-
tion’s disclosure because, by definition of a positive externality, the expected 
gain on their shares in competitors will offset the loss on their shares in the is-
suer. 
Id.; see also Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 439-46. But these institu-
tional investors are unlikely to fully capture the consumer surplus gains that result from 
reducing a firm’s monopoly power. But see William J. Carney, Jurisdictional Choice in Se-
curities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 717, 736 (2001) (arguing that the SEC should be 
guided in its regulatory agenda by a shareholder primacy norm and not be concerned with 
enhancing welfare generally). 
 118. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable In-
formation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980). 
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to value a company’s securities.119 These studies found that investors 
used business operating information to value a company’s securities, 
and that much of this information was not being disclosed by public 
companies.120 
 These studies considered why this type of information, although 
of interest to investors, was infrequently disclosed. Public companies 
explained that they withheld disclosure of this information because of 
concerns about the competitive disadvantaging that its publication 
might cause.121 For example, one of these studies concluded: 
Disclosing competitively sensitive information is a major concern 
for companies; for many, it is the single largest concern about the 
Committee’s recommendations [that more business operating in-
formation be disclosed]. Companies are concerned that competitors 
would gain new insight from business reporting under the Com-
mittee’s model and use that insight to a company’s competitive 
disadvantage.122 
It is, of course, possible that companies relied on this “competitive 
harm” rationale to explain their choice not to disclose this informa-
tion when there were other, more significant, costs involved. 
 A second line of empirical analysis also suggests that concerns 
about competitive disadvantaging are a significant factor in limiting 
                                                                                                                    
 119. Starting in the 1970s, critics of U.S. public company mandatory disclosure re-
quirements argued that the information the SEC required companies to disclose did not 
provide sophisticated investors with information that was useful in valuing a company’s 
securities. This issue was brought to the attention of the academic community primarily by 
the efforts of Homer Kripke. See Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths 
and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (1970) [hereinafter Kripke, Some Myths] 
(concluding that the information companies were required to disclose at that time was 
“useless” and that “we should see what investors really need”); see also HOMER KRIPKE, 
THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979) 
[hereinafter KRIPKE, IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE] (summarizing his criticisms of the lack of 
relevant information required to be disclosed under mandatory disclosure requirements). 
In response to these concerns, several studies were undertaken to determine what infor-
mation sophisticated investors actually used to value public company securities. See AM. 
INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, IMPROVING BUSINESS REPORTING–A CONSUMER 
FOCUS (1994) [hereinafter JENKINS REPORT]; ASS’N FOR INV. MGMT & RESEARCH, 
FINANCIAL REPORTING IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND (1993) [hereinafter AIMR REPORT]; 
FASB, ELECTRONIC DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS REPORTING INFORMATION (2001); FASB, 
GAAP-SEC DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (2001); FASB, IMPROVING BUSINESS REPORTING: 
INSIGHTS INTO ENHANCING VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES (2001) [hereinafter IMPROVING 
BUSINESS REPORTING]; WAYNE S. UPTON, JR., FASB, SPECIAL REPORT: BUSINESS AND 
FINANCIAL REPORTING, CHALLENGES FROM THE NEW ECONOMY (2001) [hereinafter UPTON 
REPORT]. The four FASB studies cited above will be cited as FASB STUDIES in subsequent 
footnotes. In the text, these studies will be referred to as “FASB Studies.” 
 120. See also infra Part IV.A.2. 
 121. Along the same lines, a study completed in 1978 found that almost ninety percent 
of corporate executives wanted disclosure requirement exemptions to be broadly construed 
to avoid requiring the disclosure of any competitively disadvantaging information. R.K. 
MAUTZ & WILLIAM G. MAY, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 97-98 
(1978). 
 122. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 119, at 5.  





disclosures by public companies. The information that companies 
provide to investors when disclosures are not made available to com-
peting firms can be compared with the information disclosed by com-
parable public companies.123 With the assistance of a corporate law 
firm involved in numerous private-financing transactions, disclosure 
practices in private transactions were reviewed.124 In these “private” 
transactions much more information is shared with investors than is 
disclosed by comparable public companies.125 This suggests that con-
cerns about allowing competitors access to proprietary information—
concerns that are less relevant in the context of private companies—
do reduce public company disclosures.126 
                                                                                                                    
 123. For additional material that foreshadows the potential usefulness of such an 
analysis, see KRIPKE, IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE, supra note 119, at 71 (“[The SEC] could, of 
course, have studied the information demanded and furnished in private placements when 
the information was controlled by the decision makers, not by the SEC.”), and Richard 
Leftwich, Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from Private Lending 
Agreements, 58 ACCT. REV. 23 (1983), and STEVEN N. KAPLAN & PER STROMBERG, 
FINANCIAL CONTRACTING THEORY MEETS THE REAL WORLD: EVIDENCE FROM VENTURE 
CAPITAL CONTRACTS, REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, 
Working Paper No. 513, 2000),  available  at  http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id 
=218175 (Mar. 2000).   
 124. The law firm of Latham & Watkins LLP provided this assistance. There are 
methodological challenges for such an analysis. Because these transactions are private, it 
is difficult to establish what are typical or customary practices. It is also true that written 
agreements do not necessarily reveal actual practices. This problem is exacerbated in pri-
vate transactions, where investors have many ways to gather information. For example, 
large investors typically receive the right to visit the company’s offices and the right to re-
quest specific information, even if the information in question is not specifically set out in 
the disclosure provisions of the investor agreements. It is common in venture capital 
agreements for large investors to have the right to  
visit and inspect any of the properties of the [c]ompany, including its books of 
account and other records (and make copies thereof and take extracts there-
from), and to discuss its affairs, finances and accounts with the [c]ompany’s of-
ficers and its independent public accountants, all at such reasonable times and 
as often as any such person may reasonable request. 
ROBERT V. GUNDERSON, JR. & LEE F. BENTON, Hi-Tech Corporation: Investors’ Rights 
Agreement, in 1 VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 9-29 (3d ed. Supp. 
1999).  
 125. See infra Part IV.C.1 (supporting this conclusion by reviewing in detail the types 
of internal management information disclosed to investors in private transactions, as com-
pared with the amount of such information disclosed to investors in comparable public 
transactions). But see Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 390 (“For example, 
in the private debt market, in which the SEC permits lower disclosure because it is re-
stricted to sophisticated (institutional and wealthy individual) investors, such investors 
demand disclosure of approximately the same information as is required to be disclosed in 
the public debt market.”); Luis F. Moreno Trevino, Access to U.S. Capital Markets for For-
eign Issuers: Rule 144A Private Placements, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 159, 195 (1993) (“[S]tan-
dardization used for recent private placements of investment grade debt securities has ex-
ceeded the expectations of market participants by containing wording almost identical to 
that utilized in prospectuses for public offerings.”). 
 126. Even in the private context, concerns about the competitive-disadvantaging costs 
of disclosure are a consideration when establishing disclosure practices. Most of the re-
viewed agreements specifically prohibit disclosure of information to an investor who could 
use the information to aid a competitor. For example, one published model agreement 
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 There are, of course, alternative explanations for the higher level 
of disclosure in private transactions, as compared with what public 
companies disclose, including: (1) public companies’ heightened con-
cerns about liability and shareholder derivative suits; (2) the collec-
tive action costs faced by investors in public companies;127 (3) differ-
ences between the types of companies that are public and those that 
are private; and (4) the fact that investors in private companies may 
be less able to sell their shares. But these alternative explanations 
for the higher level of disclosure in private transactions are not as vi-
able as might appear. First, even if public companies do face a higher 
risk of being sued than do private firms, it is not obvious that less 
disclosure rather than more disclosure reduces the risk of such 
suits.128 Moreover, if concerns about liability were a significant factor 
in shaping public company disclosure practices, then one would ex-
pect regulations or legislation reducing the possibility of liability for 
disclosures—such as the safe harbor provided to forward-looking 
statements starting in 1978129 or the liability-reducing measures in 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995130—to alter dis-
closure practices. But neither of these changes appears to have led to 
a significant increase in disclosures by public companies. Second, the 
collective action problems faced by public shareholders are receding 
with increased cooperation among institutional investors and effi-
ciencies exploited from owning stakes in many companies.131 Third, 
there are increasingly fewer differences between the types of inves-
tors and companies that are public and those that are private.132 Fi-
nally, the reduced ability to sell shares in private transactions could 
also suggest that there are fewer benefits from disclosure, and so 
there should be less, not more, disclosure in these transactions.133 
                                                                                                                    
stated: “The Company shall not be required to comply with [the covenants that set forth 
the disclosure requirements] in respect of any Holder whom the Company reasonably de-
termines to be a competitor or an officer, employee, director or greater than ten percent 
(10%) stockholder of a competitor.” GUNDERSON & BENTON, supra note 124, at 9-31. 
 127. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395 (1983) (arguing that collective action costs limit the usefulness of shareholder 
voting as a means to reduce agency costs in public companies). If the costs of collective ac-
tion are higher for public company shareholders, then the benefits of disclosure would be 
lower, which could reduce the amount of information that it would be optimal for public 
companies to disclose. 
 128. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 130. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 102, 
109 Stat. 737, 753-56. 
 131. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a 
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. REG. 174 (2001). Moreover, the 
collective action problem is a form of market failure, and so disclosure practices reduced as 
a result of these costs may not be socially optimal. 
 132. See generally Seligman, supra note 18. 
 133. Moreover, differences between investors’ options when holding public securities, 
as compared with private securities—such as the ability to sell shares instead of aggres-





The disclosure of substantially more information in private transac-
tions than in comparable public transactions indicates the signifi-
cance of concerns about the competitive-disadvantaging costs of dis-
closing proprietary information. 
(b)   Theoretical Findings on Competitive-Disadvantaging Concerns 
 Analytical models of public company disclosure practices also sug-
gest that concerns about competitive disadvantaging are a significant 
factor in limiting the amount of information public companies dis-
close. Economists have constructed information disclosure models 
generally.134 One of the central findings of this work is that under 
certain conditions all private information will be disclosed; that is, 
private information will unravel. The intuition behind this finding is 
that if a buyer can reasonably assume that a seller will reveal posi-
tive information, then a buyer will conclude that silence implies the 
worst possible news. Given this presumption, a seller will have an 
incentive to disclose all but the worst possible information. The cu-
mulative effect will be that all relevant information will be disclosed 
without regulatory intervention. 
 A next step is to consider situations where unraveling does not oc-
cur. Unraveling will not occur when there is a rational justification 
for silence other than the desire to withhold bad news. In the context 
of information disclosure by public firms, concerns about releasing 
competitive-disadvantaging information are generally accepted as 
one of the best explanations for the lack of unraveling.135 Professor 
Robert H. Gertner at the University of Chicago Graduate School of 
Business, in a review of the disclosure and unraveling literature, ex-
plains: 
One then has to ask why complete unraveling would not occur 
without the law. The best answer is that the real cost of disclosure 
is the revelation of performance information which can benefit 
competitors and potential competitors. For example, a company 
that learns of another company performing well in a related line of 
business may choose to enter and compete. This possibility limits 
                                                                                                                    
sively monitoring manager performance—do not necessarily diminish the relevance of the 
private transaction benchmark. The socially optimal level of monitoring and disclosure is 
probably more accurately revealed by practices in private transactions, where selling 
shares and other forms of shirking are not as prevalent. 
 134. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private 
Disclosure of Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981); Paul R. Milgrom, Good News 
and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON. 380 (1982). 
 135. This is consistent with the consensus among legal scholars that disclosing pro-
prietary information reduces public company disclosures. See, e.g., Franco, supra note 10, 
at 271 (“The effect of proprietary costs on issuers may exert an even more powerful influ-
ence in curbing such disclosure than liability costs.”). 
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the negative inference from a failure to disclose and leads to in-
complete disclosure.136 
 The conclusion that the desire to protect proprietary information 
explains the absence of complete unraveling in public company dis-
closures does not mean that companies will only withhold informa-
tion that is competitively disadvantaging. Once it is no longer true 
that an investor can infer the worst possible conclusion when infor-
mation is withheld, a new equilibrium level of disclosure is estab-
lished. There will now be situations where managers have other bad 
news that they may withhold under cover of the desire to protect the 
firm from making competitively-disadvantaging disclosures.137 
B.   Estimating the Potential Social Cost of a Positive Externality 
 There is a significant market failure in the disclosure practices of 
public companies that results from interfirm externalities. The next 
step is to estimate the potential cost of this market failure. As it 
turns out, the potential cost of an interfirm externalities market fail-
ure is much greater than previously realized. Previous scholarship 
estimates the potential cost of a market failure in disclosure practices 
caused by interfirm externalities by looking at the difference between 
the costs that would be borne by a company making a disclosure and 
the benefits that would be realized by other firms from receiving the 
disclosed information.138 Romano states: “Finally, it is altogether pos-
sible that in the case of a positive externality, the harm to the dis-
closing firm would be greater than the benefit to rival firms from dis-
closing information. If this were the situation, then the social welfare 
maximizing policy would not be to mandate disclosure.”139  
                                                                                                                    
 136. Robert H. Gertner, Disclosure and Unraveling, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 608 (1999); see also Verrecchia, supra note 35, at 166. 
 137. See Shavell, supra note 23; see also Suil Pae, Discretionary Disclosure, Efficiency, 
and Signal Informativeness, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 279 (2002). 
 138. It is unclear which specific calculation Fox relies on. Fox states: “Conversely, if 
Professor Romano is correct that a negative effect is in fact as likely as a positive one, a 
major element of my argument for retaining mandatory disclosure fails.” Fox, Issuer 
Choice, supra note 15, at 570 n.22. This suggests that Fox may consider the appropriate 
measure of potential harm from interfirm externalities the net of the costs of disclosure 
and benefits forgone. 
 139. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 435. Romano reaches this con-
clusion in her effort to formalize Fox’s argument, an argument she goes on to reject for 
several reasons. In particular, she offers this calculation in the context of evaluating the 
relevance of a theoretical analysis of the efficacy of disclosure offered by Ronald Dye. Id.; 
see Ronald A. Dye, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and 
Real Externalities, 65 ACCT. REV. 1 (1990). One assumption in Dye’s model is that disclo-
sures may generate either a positive or a negative externality. It may be that Romano’s 
discussion of the relevance of this net effect of disclosures is limited to determining 
whether Dye’s assumptions are realistic. To this author, however, Romano appears to be 
making the broader claim that determining whether disclosures may generate either a 





But the correct calculation of the potential social cost of a positive 
externality, in fact, has two separate components. The calculation 
that Romano focuses on addresses only the first component. To de-
termine the cost of an externality, we must consider both whether it 
is economic to unbundle the component of production directly causing 
the externality and what the social gains are from producing the good 
as compared with not producing the good, whether or not unbundling 
is economic.140 A simple example in the more familiar context of a 
negative externality (as compared with the case of a positive exter-
nality) can help clarify this bifurcation. Suppose a factory creates 
ninety dollars of pollution that the factory owner does not have to pay 
for. The first question is whether pollution abatement can be pur-
chased for less than ninety dollars. But there is a second question as 
well, regardless of whether or not pollution abatement (or “unbun-
dling” in my formulation) is cost-effective. That question is whether 
the production of the good generating the pollution, whether or not it 
is cost-effective to abate the pollution, should continue. In this con-
text, the solution to the problem is relatively simple: make the fac-
tory owner internalize the ninety-dollar pollution expense. Then the 
manufacturer can evaluate (1) if pollution abatement is economic, 
and (2) whether production is still profitable. 
The insight is that an externality removes from the producer of a 
good information about one of the costs or benefits of production. The 
significance of not having access to this information can only be de-
termined in an equilibria context. The correct estimate of the poten-
tial cost of such a market failure is therefore provided by looking to 
the gross amount of the potential gains or losses not recognized by a 
company establishing disclosure policies. To demonstrate this conclu-
sion, this Article will provide a numerical example involving a posi-
tive externality. 
1.   Numerical Example with Apple Trees and Honeybees 
 The example of a positive externality typically used by econo-
mists is that of a beehive owner operating near an apple orchard.141 
Beehives are said to produce more honey because of their proximity 
                                                                                                                    
positive or a negative externality in the way she proposes determines the social welfare ef-
fect of this externality. 
 140. Coase identified this second component. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960) (“A better approach would seem to be to start our analy-
sis with a situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a 
proposed policy change and to attempt to decide whether the new situation would be, in to-
tal, better or worse than the original one.”). 
 141. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 577 (4th ed. 2000); 
WALTER J. WESSELS, ECONOMICS 494 (3d ed. 2000). The first article to use this example 
was J.E. Mead, External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, 52 
ECON. J. 54 (1952). 
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to an apple orchard.142 However, the apple orchard owner is not paid 
for the increased value that her orchard provides to the beekeeper.143 
Therefore, not as many apple orchards will be planted as would be 
socially optimal. I now use this setting to show that the value of the 
benefits not recognized by the producer of a good, here the increased 
productivity apple orchards provide to beekeepers, provides the best 
estimate of the potential cost of a positive externality market failure.  
 Suppose that a farmer is deciding whether to plant an apple or-
chard. She carefully calculates her private costs and private benefits 
from planting the apple orchard. She knows of the beekeeper next 
door and knows that she will not be able to profit from the increased 
honey production that her trees would provide. The farmer deter-
mines that she will lose $10 if she plants the apple orchard and de-
cides not to proceed. If the farmer had planted the apple orchard, the 
beekeeper would have generated an additional $25 in profit from in-
creased honey production. In this example, the social cost of the posi-
tive externality would be $15: the net of the $10 foregone cost to the 
farmer, if she had planted the orchard, and the $25 foregone gain to 
the beekeeper. 
 The first observation is that this calculation, correctly showing a 
social cost from the positive externality of $15, is different than the 
calculation proposed by Romano. Romano, in her analysis, compares 
the gains that other firms might realize (from access to proprietary 
information) and the cost to the firm that results from producing 
these gains (the cost of disclosing this proprietary information). In 
the apple tree and honeybee illustration, this would be equivalent to 
comparing the benefit that the apple trees provide to the beekeeper 
($25) with the costs or benefits that result from the bees’ presence 
among the apple trees. It is specifically by providing the bees use of 
the orchard that additional honey is produced, just as it is specifically 
by disclosing proprietary information that other firms benefit. The 
cost or benefit to the apple orchards from the presence of bees was 
not provided in the calculation of social costs above. It may be that 
                                                                                                                    
 142. I was unable to find evidence supporting a benefit in terms of increased honey 
production from the proximity of beehives to apple trees. However, there is clear evidence 
of a benefit in the opposite direction; that is, the proximity of honeybees does substantially 
increase apple production. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic 
Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1972) (finding that it is primarily the orchard owners, 
not the beekeepers, who benefit from the presence of honeybees among fruit trees). 
 143. This is an odd example of a positive externality for several reasons. First, the 
quantifiable benefits appear to be provided to orchard owners, rather than to beehive own-
ers. Second, because the parties are few and proximate, it would seem that transaction 
costs should be low, and so a significant market failure unlikely. And, in fact, payments 
from orchards are a major source of income for many beehive owners. Cheung, supra note 
142. Third, by focusing on a relationship that is almost always symbiotic, the more complex 
situation, examined in this Article, where generating a positive externality imposes a cost 
on the producer is not explored. 





bees improve the productivity of apple trees,144 or it may be that our 
farmer is highly allergic to bees and has a strong distaste for the in-
creased presence of bees. Let us assume that our farmer hates bees 
and had placed a negative value of $30 on having bees buzzing about 
her orchard when she decided whether to plant the apple trees.145 If 
we had only compared the cost that the bees impose on the farmer 
($30) with the benefits the apple trees provide to the beekeeper ($25), 
we would have concluded that planting the orchard would impose a 
social cost of $5. This is the calculation used by Romano, but this is 
the wrong conclusion. This calculation ignores the other benefits that 
are generated from planting the apple orchard. Because the net cost 
of planting the apple orchard is $10 and the cost to the farmer from 
having the bees among the apple trees is $30, the other benefits from 
planting the apple orchard must be $20. We need to add this $20 to 
the social cost of $5 imputed from the Romano calculation to get the 
correct social gain from planting the orchard, $15. In fact, a compari-
son of the costs that bees impose on the farmer with the benefits the 
proximity of the orchard provides to the beekeeper addresses a dif-
ferent issue than a measure of the social cost of an externality. This 
comparison is relevant to determine how much should be spent to 
prevent the bees from entering the apple orchard. In the example 
above, where the bees impose a cost on the farmer of $30 and access 
to the orchard benefits the beekeeper by $25, if the bees can be kept 
out of the trees for less than $5, then this should be done.146 But, if 
the bees cannot be kept out of the apple trees for less than $5, then 
this should not be treated as a separable component of production. 
The analysis returns to determining social welfare with and without 
the apple trees, assuming the presence of bees among the apple trees. 
To generalize, a comparison of the costs and benefits of a factor of 
production is only relevant in determining whether or how much it 
would be worth spending to unbundle this factor of production. 
 So now we move to the second step: a comparison of the equilibria 
with and without production of the good, or, in our hypothetical, with 
and without the new apple orchard planted. Two pieces of informa-
tion are needed to make this calculation: (1) the benefit the bee-
keeper receives from use of the apple orchard (the amount of the ex-
ternality), and (2) the farmer’s expected loss or gain from planting 
the orchard (the net costs or benefits excluding the externality). Both 
                                                                                                                    
 144. See id. (confirming that such an economic benefit is, in fact, typically provided by 
honeybees). 
 145. Assuming there is a cost associated with providing the positive externality, then 
this example becomes more comparable to the disclosure of proprietary information, which 
will typically harm the firm making the disclosure. 
 146. This calculation assumes that the orchard owner, at this point, is able to realize 
the benefits from the increased honey production. If this were not the case, then the or-
chard owner would be willing to pay up to $30 to keep the bees out of the orchard. 
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pieces of information may be difficult to determine. On one hand, the 
beekeeper might be hesitant to reveal just how valuable access to the 
apple orchard is, lest she be required to pay for this access. On the 
other hand, the farmer decided not to proceed with planting the apple 
orchard. To know how much she expected to lose from planting the 
apple orchard, we would need to know of her projected $10 shortfall, 
but all that is revealed by her inaction is that she did not expect a 
positive return from the apple orchard. 
 Consider if we had access to only one of these two pieces of infor-
mation, the profit the beekeeper would have gained had her bees had 
use of the apple orchard ($25). With this information, it is simple to 
determine an upper limit on the social cost of the positive externality. 
That limit is $25 and is determined without knowing why the farmer 
chose not to plant the apple orchard. This is not to say that the social 
cost of this positive externality will be $25. It could well be that the 
farmer would have lost $30 in planting the orchard, in which case 
there would be no harm from this market failure. Still, the gross 
amount of the third-party benefits not realized by the party making a 
production decision, not the net difference between the costs and 
benefits of the factor of production generating the externality, pro-
vides the upper limit on the social cost that could result from the ex-
ternality. 
2.   Estimating Social Costs from Interfirm Externalities in 
Disclosure Practices 
 The apple trees and honeybees hypothetical provides one way to 
estimate the potential harm from a positive externality. Applying 
this analysis to public company disclosure practices shows that the 
potential harm from interfirm externalities may be quite substantial. 
If Romano had been correct, the measure of the potential harm from 
a positive externality in disclosure practices would be the net of the 
firm’s cost from disclosing proprietary information and the benefit to 
other firms from access to this proprietary information. Based on this 
net calculation, it is unlikely that interfirm externalities would im-
pose significant costs. Gains to competitors would be more or less off-
set by the losses to the disclosing firm, and it would be improbable 
that imposing an extensive set of disclosure regulations on all public 
companies could be justified on the basis of interfirm externalities.147 
However, the potential cost of a positive externality in public com-
pany disclosure practices is better estimated by looking solely at the 
gains other firms might receive from the disclosure of proprietary in-
formation. 
                                                                                                                    
 147. This is the conclusion that Romano reaches based on her calculation. Romano, 
Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 435. 





 A simple numerical example set in the context of disclosures by a 
public company is helpful. Suppose that the cost to Firm A of disclos-
ing a specific piece of information—the profitability of its various 
products—is $100, and the benefit that this information, if disclosed, 
would provide to Firm A’s competitors is also $100. Suppose further 
that the disclosure of this profitability information would also benefit 
Firm A, perhaps by reducing agency costs by $90, and these agency 
cost-reducing benefits cannot be realized without disclosing this 
product profitability information. If Firm A is unable to capture the 
benefits this disclosure would provide to its competitors, then Firm A 
will choose not to disclose this information. To disclose this informa-
tion would cost Firm A $10 (the $100 cost less the $90 gain). The so-
cial cost of this decision is $90, since all of Firm A’s costs of disclosure 
would have led to comparable gains at other firms. In this example, 
we see that even when the competitive-disadvantaging costs of dis-
closure are equal to the benefits provided to the firm’s competitors, 
the distortion resulting from interfirm externalities can be quite 
costly. 
 Of course, the critical issue is the extent to which this numerical 
example is realistic. Are the potential gains from the disclosure of 
proprietary information that the firm making such a disclosure is 
unable to capture large, and why can’t the other benefits from disclo-
sure be unbundled from the benefits generated from the disclosure of 
proprietary information? Two approaches above were used to show 
that public companies limit their disclosures because of concerns 
about the competitive-disadvantaging costs of disclosures. The first 
approach was to look to studies that consider why public companies 
do not disclose much of the information investors find useful.148 The 
second approach was to compare the disclosure practices of private 
companies with the disclosure practices of comparable public compa-
nies.149 Both of these approaches can be used to estimate the scale of 
the positive externalities not recognized by firms making disclosures. 
First, assume that the competitive-disadvantaging costs avoided by 
the companies withholding disclosures are roughly comparable to the 
unrealized gains that those disclosures would have provided to other 
firms. On average, one company’s losses will approximate other com-
panies’ gains.150 With this assumption, we can look to evidence show-
ing the extent to which public companies reduce disclosures to avoid 
competitive disadvantaging, as a way to approximate the foregone 
benefits these disclosures would provide. 
                                                                                                                    
 148. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text. 
 150. One notable exception to this assumption, discussed supra Part II.A.3, occurs 
when disclosures reduce monopoly power and generate consumer welfare gains. 
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 Before proceeding it is useful to note that this method of estimat-
ing the potential cost of a positive externality in public company dis-
closure practices may be inaccurate for two reasons. First, it is diffi-
cult to assign a monetary value to the decision to withhold the disclo-
sure of proprietary information. Second, the third-party cost of a spe-
cific factor of production is useful in determining how much it would 
be worth spending to remove this component from the production 
process.151 In the hypothetical example of apple trees and honeybees, 
the preliminary question was whether the bees could be efficiently 
unbundled from the production of apples. In that context, answering 
the question required determining how much it would cost to keep 
the bees away from the apple trees. In the context of disclosure, 
whether it is possible to unbundle the adverse effects of disclosing 
competitively disadvantaging information without losing the other 
benefits such disclosures might provide is a more complex question. 
Certainly some of the benefits of disclosure could be easily unbundled 
from the disclosure of proprietary information. For example, the pre-
dominant effect of disclosing trade secrets would be to transfer pro-
prietary information from the disclosing firm to other firms, with few 
other benefits provided to the firm making the disclosure.152 How-
ever, other types of disclosures, such as the profitability of the vari-
ous products a firm sells, would appear to trigger many of the costs 
and benefits of disclosure simultaneously. 
 An article by Paul Mahoney at the University of Virginia Law 
School, arguing that the SEC requires the disclosure of too much in-
formation by public companies, considers the question of the extent 
to which the benefits from various types of disclosures can be unbun-
dled.153 Mahoney argues that the information that public companies 
disclose can be separated into two categories: agency cost information 
and accuracy enhancement information.154 For Mahoney, agency cost 
information is information about transactions between the company 
and its agents, and accuracy enhancement information is informa-
tion that could affect the stock price, such as information about the 
economic well-being of the firm.155 Mahoney argues that agency cost 
information, but not accuracy enhancement information, is of use in 
reducing agency costs.156 If Mahoney were correct, this would sub-
stantially reduce the potential cost of interfirm externalities in public 
company disclosure practices. Companies could disclose Mahoney’s 
                                                                                                                    
 151. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 152. The details of trade secrets would in most situations be only moderately useful to 
an investor because learning the trade secret details is unlikely to be the best or only way 
to determine their value or manager effectiveness. 
 153. See Mahoney, supra note 13. 
 154. Id. at 1054. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 





agency cost information, information that is unlikely to competitively 
disadvantage the firm, but withhold accuracy-enhancing information. 
The primary benefits of disclosures would remain without requiring 
disclosure of competitively disadvantaging information.  
 But Mahoney’s argument for why accuracy-enhancing informa-
tion does not provide agency cost-reducing benefits is not convincing, 
and a review of the evidence suggests that the facile separation Ma-
honey offers between different types of information and the different 
benefits their disclosure provides is not realistic. Mahoney supports 
his claim that the disclosure of accuracy enhancement information 
does not substantially reduce agency costs in two ways. First, Ma-
honey points to the fact that prior to the 1930s information about the 
economic condition of the firm was not subject to mandatory disclo-
sure requirements.157 But disclosure practices prior to the 1930s have 
little probative value, particularly given the dramatic evolution in 
business and accounting practices over the past seventy years. Sec-
ond, Mahoney argues that it would be a mistake to “recast the accu-
racy enhancement model in agency cost terms by arguing that all in-
formation about a company’s performance is relevant to the share-
holders’ attempts to monitor managers.”158 Mahoney explains:  
Although other sorts of agency problems exist, they were not the 
source of mandatory disclosure rules, and I do not believe they can 
be effectively addressed through mandatory disclosure rules. If 
they could be so addressed, one could recast the accuracy en-
hancement model in agency cost terms by arguing that all infor-
mation about a company’s performance is relevant to the share-
holders’ attempts to monitor managers. For my purposes, however, 
“agency information” is a distinctive set of information about the 
agent’s use of his delegated powers to sell his own property or ser-
vices to the principal.159 
Thus, Mahoney’s claim that accuracy enhancement disclosures can-
not reduce agency costs relies on the assertion that “he does not be-
lieve the disclosure of information about a company’s performance 
“can be effectively addressed through mandatory disclosure rules.”160 
At best, Mahoney is assuming what he is trying to prove, that “[t]he 
normative prescriptions of the agency cost model tend to point in the 
opposite direction of those derived from the accuracy enhancement 
model.”161 By assuming the two types of information provide two dif-
ferent kinds of benefits, he can argue for requiring disclosure of 
                                                                                                                    
 157. Id. at 1060-65. 
 158. Id. at 1054.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1050.  
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agency cost-reducing information, but not accuracy-enhancing infor-
mation.162  
But the information that Mahoney labels as accuracy enhance-
ment information would almost certainly be useful in reducing 
agency costs. Again, disclosure practices in private transactions are 
instructive.163 In private transactions there would be less reason to 
share with investors information whose sole function was to improve 
the accuracy of share prices because in these transactions securities 
are not publicly traded. Yet in these transactions more, not less, in-
formation about the firm’s economic condition is disclosed.164 This 
suggests disclosing this information provides benefits other than ac-
curacy enhancement, benefits that are most likely generated by re-
ducing agency costs. Moreover, many of the mechanisms by which 
disclosures reduce agency costs are directly mediated by more accu-
rate share prices, and more accurate share prices are the direct re-
sult of disclosing accuracy-enhancing information. For example, 
managers have fewer opportunities to profitably trade the firm’s 
shares if share prices are more accurate.165 Similarly, the operation of 
the market for corporate control is facilitated when share prices re-
flect the value of the company’s assets while under current manage-
ment.166 Nor is it surprising that information about the firm’s eco-
nomic well-being is helpful in reducing agency costs. Managers can 
fail investors not just by directly expropriating funds from the firm, 
but also by inadequately exploiting the business opportunities avail-
able to the firm. 
 Much information that is useful to investors is withheld by public 
companies out of concern for the gains competitors would realize 
from these disclosures, and it is not a simple matter for companies to 
disclose information that would benefit the disclosing firm without 
also disclosing information that would competitively disadvantage 
the firm. Together, these two conclusions show that interfirm exter-
                                                                                                                    
 162. There is an alternative interpretation of Mahoney’s argument. Perhaps Mahoney 
does not intend to deny the agency cost reduction benefits from the disclosure of informa-
tion about the economic condition of the firm, but rather to focus on the fact that “it is diffi-
cult to specify ex ante what types of information [about the economic condition of the firm] 
are relevant without engaging in overkill.” Id. at 1094. In other words, the distinction he is 
drawing is not between information that is useful for agency cost reduction purposes and 
that which is useful for accuracy enhancement purposes, but rather the distinction is be-
tween information that is more effectively made part of a mandatory disclosure scheme 
and information that is more amenable to a negotiated disclosure agreement between prin-
cipals and investors. If this is his claim, the analysis in this Article suggests that, in fact, 
the opposite is the case: that it is information about the agent’s use of the firm’s resources 
that is more amenable to a negotiated disclosure agreement between managers and inves-
tors, because it is not subject to a significant market failure.  
 163. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text. 
 164. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 





nalities cause a substantial market failure in public company disclo-
sure practices. But this finding does not by itself justify regulatory 
intervention. Rather, this finding shows that what is at stake justi-
fies proceeding with a consideration of the efficacy of imposing cor-
rective disclosure requirements. 
C.   Evaluating the Efficacy of Imposing Corrective Regulations 
 We have shown that the costs of interfirm externalities may be 
quite substantial.167 The next step is to determine the circumstances 
under which a regulatory intervention to correct this market failure 
would make sense. 
1.   A Method to Compare the Costs and Benefits of Disclosure 
Regulation 
 The evaluation of a regulatory intervention must weigh all of the 
costs and benefits of imposing a disclosure requirement on public 
companies. The costs and benefits of disclosures were identified 
above.168 To evaluate a regulatory intervention, the costs resulting 
from the regulatory process itself must be added to this list. Regula-
tion costs can be separated into administration costs, avoidance 
costs, and waste costs.169 Administration costs are the costs of con-
structing, monitoring, and enforcing disclosure requirements. Avoid-
ance costs refer to the distortionary effects that disclosure require-
ments can have on a company’s business practices. For example, a 
company may produce less internal information if the company’s 
management knows that internal information will be publicly dis-
seminated. Finally, there are several costs that can be best charac-
terized as regulatory waste. These are costs that result from the fact 
that the optimal regulatory scheme will not be a perfect scheme, and 
so some disclosure will be required that is unnecessary and other 
disclosure that should be required will not be. Other regulatory 
waste costs may be incurred when, and to the extent that, the regu-
lator is “captured” by the regulated firms.170 
 Weighing the costs and benefits of a regulatory intervention into 
public company disclosure practices requires a fairly complex calcula-
tion. Separating the analysis into three components makes the calcu-
                                                                                                                    
 167. See supra Part III.B. 
 168. See supra Part II. 
 169. These distinctions are similar to those provided by Beaver, supra note 16, at 629 
(“[T]he costs of regulation [of public company disclosures] include the costs involved in the 
development, compliance, enforcement, and litigation of disclosure regulations.”). Compli-
ance costs are not included here because they are included in the firm’s production costs of 
disclosures. 
 170. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
164  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:123 
 
  
lation more tractable. These three components are: (1) a comparison 
of the costs and benefits of a disclosure requirement, whether or not a 
company has public securities; (2) a comparison of the short-term 
costs and benefits of transferring proprietary information from one 
firm to many firms; and (3) a comparison of the remaining costs and 
benefits of requiring the disclosure of certain information by all pub-
lic firms. The first component is a comparison between the incre-
mental production costs from a disclosure requirement and the in-
cremental benefits a firm would receive from these disclosures, 
whether or not the firm has publicly traded securities. The second 
component is a comparison between the competitive-disadvantaging 
costs of a disclosure, the effect such a disclosure requirement has on 
the firm’s competitors, positive or negative, and any consumer sur-
plus gains from the disclosure.171 The third component is a compari-
son between regulation costs and the disincentives to invest in inno-
vation, on one hand, and the incremental benefits a firm would re-
ceive from the required disclosures as a result of having publicly 
traded securities and economy-wide gains, on the other hand. Table 2 
shows these three comparisons:172 
                                                                                                                    
 171. This comparison of the competitive-disadvantaging costs incurred by a company 
making a disclosure with the benefits provided to other firms and consumer surplus gains 
from the disclosure is similar to the comparison that Fox and Romano focus on. See supra 
Part III.B.1. The differences are (1) here, the possibility of consumer surplus gains is in-
cluded in the comparison, and (2) this is understood to be only one of three components 
necessary to evaluate the efficacy of a disclosure requirement.  
 172. This Table rearranges the items listed in Table 1 above, with the addition of the 
costs of regulation. 






Benefits from Disclosure Costs of Disclosure 
COMPONENT 1 (benefits): 
• Reduced agency costs: im-
proved monitoring of man-
agers. 
COMPONENT 1 (costs): 
• Direct costs of preparing 
and disseminating infor-
mation about the firm. 
COMPONENT 2 (benefits): 
• Competitor gains. 
• Consumer surplus gains. 
 
COMPONENT 2 (costs): 
• Competitive disadvantag-
ing. 
• Competitor losses. 
COMPONENT 3 (benefits): 
• Reduced agency costs: fa-
cilitate corporate control 
market; fewer insider trad-
ing opportunities (with 
public securities). 
• More accurate share 
prices. 
• Lower cost of capital. 
• Improved liquidity. 
• Improved economy-wide 
asset allocation. 
 COMPONENT 3 (costs): 
• Long-term disincentive to 
invest in innovation. 




By analyzing each of these components in the context of a specific 
disclosure requirement, one can estimate whether a disclosure re-
quirement would be welfare-enhancing.  
2.   Evaluating a Hypothetical Disclosure Requirement 
 To illustrate how this “component” analysis assists in evaluating a 
specific disclosure requirement, it is helpful first to analyze a hypo-
thetical disclosure requirement. The hypothetical disclosure re-
quirement considered is called the “low-basis asset sales disclosure 
requirement.” The low-basis asset sales disclosure requirement 
would require public companies to disclose all details with respect to 
the sale of an asset if: (1) such asset were created as a by-product of 
other production efforts; (2) such asset has little or no book value;173 
and (3) more than five percent of the company’s gross profit in any 
quarter comes from the sale of this asset. Admittedly, this is an oddly 
tailored disclosure requirement, but it is helpful to show how the 
component analysis of the efficacy of a disclosure requirement works. 
                                                                                                                    
 173. The absence of book value makes it difficult for someone who only has access to fi-
nancial statements to determine how much of such a product is being sold. 
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 The hypothetical company to which the low-basis asset sales dis-
closure requirement will be applied is Doodles Corp. Doodles Corp. is 
a hypothetical public company that has produced and distributed 
animated feature films for the past sixty years. Doodles Corp.’s man-
agers recently discovered an unexpectedly large and vibrant market 
for the animation cels produced as a by-product of the techniques 
used to create animated films. By selling more of these animation 
cels, Doodles Corp.’s managers now consistently report improving 
earnings. Doodles Corp. does not disclose the extent to which earn-
ings from the sale of animation cels contribute to the company’s re-
ported earnings. Investors believe incorrectly that Doodles Corp.’s 
growing earnings are indicative of growth in Doodles Corp.’s ongoing 
animated feature film business and do not realize that they are in-
stead the result of an increasing dependence on the continued viabil-
ity of the market for cels from old animated films.174 Nor do other 
companies who own animated cels realize just how large and profit-
able the market is for these animation cels.  
 Under current disclosure requirements, Doodles Corp. would not 
be required to disclose the share of its profits generated from the 
sales of animation cels.175 Nor would Doodles Corp. managers elect to 
disclose this information, since its nondisclosure provides them many 
benefits.176 Let us assume, under the low-basis asset sales disclosure 
                                                                                                                    
 174. This hypothetical is similar to the facts in the SEC’s main enforcement action ap-
plying the MD&A requirements. See supra note 27; Caterpillar, Inc., 50 S.E.C. 903 (1992), 
1992 SEC LEXIS 786. Caterpillar had not disclosed its reliance on the contributions to prof-
its that came from the earnings generated by Caterpillar’s Brazilian subsidiary. But in the 
Caterpillar situation it was a dramatic devaluation of the Brazilian currency which the 
SEC argued triggered the disclosure obligation. There is no comparable dramatic change in 
circumstances in the hypothetical presented here. 
 175. This is assuming these cels are not sold through a separate segment of Doodles 
Corp.’s business. (At The Walt Disney Company, sales and profits from animated films and 
cels sales would be reported in two different segments, Studio Entertainment and Con-
sumer Products, respectively.) At most, Doodles Corp. might be required to make a qualita-
tive acknowledgement that the sales of animated cels contributed to its profits under the 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), see supra note 27. The five percent hurdle 
of the low-basis asset sales disclosure requirement would not be relevant under current 
disclosure requirements. In 1999 the SEC released Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 
to emphasize that even a relatively small quantitative effect (under five percent) would 
still be considered material under many circumstances. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 
64 Fed. Reg. 45, 150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211); see Kenneth C. 
Fang & Brad Jacobs, Clarifying and Protecting Materiality Standards in Financial State-
ments: A Review of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin, 99 BUS. LAW. 1039 (2000). 
 176. Nor, even if it were feasible, would the company’s managers and investors neces-
sarily have precommitted to require disclosure of this particular information because the 
cost to Doodles Corp. in terms of lost monopoly power is unlikely to be recouped, even if in-
vestors own shares in other animation companies as well. See supra note 117 (discussing 
the possibility of investors in several firms establishing disclosure policies); supra Part 
II.B.3 (showing how disclosure can lead to gains in consumer welfare rather than benefits 
to competing firms). 





requirement, that Doodles Corp. would be required to disclose the de-
tails of these sales.  
 The efficacy of the low-basis asset sales disclosure requirement, as 
it would apply to Doodles Corp., can be evaluated by considering in 
turn the three components described above.177 First, the costs of pre-
paring and disseminating the information required to be disclosed 
under this provision are compared with the benefits these disclosures 
provide whether or not a company has publicly traded securities. In-
cremental production costs from the low-basis asset sales disclosure 
requirement should be minimal, since this information should be 
readily available within the firm and relatively inexpensive to in-
clude with disclosure materials already provided to investors. On the 
other hand, the dissemination of the low-basis asset sales informa-
tion could have significant agency cost reducing benefits, even if 
Doodles Corp. did not have publicly traded securities. For example, if 
the scope of the animated cels market was not disclosed by Doodles 
Corp. and not readily apparent to potential competitors, then the 
Doodles Corp. managers could sell this information to other compa-
nies with animated cel libraries to the detriment of Doodles Corp.178 
 The second component—addressing the trade-off between the 
short-term costs of giving up exclusive access to proprietary informa-
tion, on one hand, and the benefits to other firms and consumers 
from gaining access to this information, on the other hand—also 
points to social welfare gains from the imposition of a low-basis asset 
sales disclosure requirement. As noted above, proprietary informa-
tion may provide a firm monopoly power.179 When such monopoly-
creating information is disclosed, lost monopoly profits would be 
more than offset by the gains to other firms and consumers.180 In the 
case of Doodles Corp., disclosure of the opportunity to sell animated 
cels could entice other firms to start selling cels from their libraries. 
The net effect of the three factors here—reduced profits to Doodles 
Corp., gains to Doodles Corp.’s competitors, and consumer gains from 
lower animated cel prices—should be positive. 
 The third component in the analysis is a comparison of long-term 
disincentives to invest and regulation costs as compared with those 
benefits that disclosure provides to companies with public securities. 
The low-basis asset sales disclosure requirement only applies to the 
sale of assets that are created as a by-product of other production ef-
forts. This should minimize the disincentives created by this disclo-
sure requirement. In the context of Doodles Corp., it seems unlikely 
that disclosing information about the sales of animated cels would 
                                                                                                                    
 177. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 178. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 180. See supra note 71. 
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create a disincentive to invest in innovation. On the other hand, the 
disclosure of low-basis asset sales would provide many benefits to a 
public company, such as Doodles Corp. For example, disclosure of 
this information could improve a potential acquirer’s analysis of Doo-
dles Corp.’s underlying value. A potential acquirer could use the in-
formation about cel sales to evaluate the different components of 
Doodles Corp.’s operations properly. It may be that Doodles Corp. is 
inadequately exploiting the opportunity to sell cels, so that manage-
ment will have a reserve to draw on to report earnings growth, or it 
may be that Doodles Corp. is overinvesting in its feature animation 
business, because of its access to internal capital from the sale of 
animation cels. 
 The low-basis asset sales disclosure requirement could also reduce 
opportunities for a firm’s managers to benefit at shareholders’ ex-
pense from their exclusive access to firm information. In the context 
of Doodles Corp., if the animated cels component of earnings were 
not disclosed, Doodles Corp.’s managers would have considerable 
control over the timing of Doodles Corp.’s reported financial perform-
ance. Doodles Corp.’s managers could use this control over the timing 
of earnings to increase the amount of their equity interest in the firm 
at the expense of other shareholders. For example, Doodles Corp.’s 
managers could generate poor earnings in anticipation of stock op-
tion grants. This would lower the strike price of their options, and 
thus increase their ownership stake in the company. There is evi-
dence that public company managers engage in just this type of op-
portunistic behavior.181 
 There may also be benefits in terms of improved asset allocations 
throughout the economy from the disclosures required under the low-
basis asset sales disclosure requirement. In the case of Doodles 
Corp., competitors and investors may interpret the public valuation 
of Doodles Corp. as indicative of opportunities in the animated film 
production business. These competitors would not realize the extent 
to which Doodles Corp.’s valuation is generated from the sale of ani-
mation cels. Competitors and investors could more accurately assess 
the profitability of the animated film business for a new entrant with 
information about the extent to which Doodles Corp.’s earnings are 
generated from the sales of cels. 
                                                                                                                    
 181.  David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and Corporate Volun-
tary Disclosure, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73 (2000) (finding earnings estimates were less posi-
tive before stock option grants than after such grants); David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO 
Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997) (finding 
that firms experienced significantly positive abnormal returns after CEO stock options 
were granted). 





 If the issue of regulation costs is not included,182 the component 
analysis shows that the low-basis asset sales disclosure requirement 
would be welfare-enhancing. The preparation and dissemination of 
this information should be relatively inexpensive. While the disclo-
sure of this information may competitively harm the firm making the 
disclosures, these losses would be more than offset by gains by a com-
pany’s competitors and consumers. The low-basis asset sales disclo-
sure requirement is unlikely to reduce investments in innovation. At 
the same time, disclosing this information could substantially reduce 
agency costs. This hypothetical case illustrates how the component 
analysis can be used to evaluate a specific disclosure requirement. 
IV.   REQUIRING PUBLIC COMPANIES TO DISCLOSE ADDITIONAL 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
 Part II developed a comprehensive microeconomic model of disclo-
sure and disclosure regulation. Part III showed how this microeco-
nomic model of disclosure could be used to evaluate a specific public 
company disclosure requirement. This Part evaluates a requirement 
that public companies disclose substantially more of the information 
used within the firm to manage operations than is currently required 
to be disclosed, applying the tools developed in Parts II and III. 
 The analysis proceeds as follows. First, a description of manage-
ment information is provided. Its similarities to the information that 
sophisticated investors use to value a company’s securities are high-
lighted. Next, three restrictions are developed on the types of man-
agement information that would be subject to a mandatory disclosure 
requirement. The subset of management information that falls 
within these three constraints is defined as Disclosable Management 
Information (“DMI”).183 Finally, the costs and benefits of requiring 
disclosure of DMI are considered. 
 There are several reasons to focus on a requirement that public 
companies disclose additional internal management information. 
First, investors and scholars have noted the growing gap between the 
information that managers use internally to understand and run 
their businesses and the information that the SEC requires public 
companies to disclose.184 Second, mandatory disclosure of manage-
                                                                                                                    
 182. Regulation costs are hard to discern when considering a narrowly tailored hypo-
thetical disclosure requirement. 
 183. This Article does not attempt to construct specific regulations that would effi-
ciently lead to the disclosure of this information. Such an effort, though important to prov-
ing the plausibility of my arguments and necessary to implement the recommendations 
here, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 184. See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M.H. WALLMAN, BROOKINGS INST., 
UNSEEN WEALTH: REPORT OF THE BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES 7 (2001); 
ROBERT E. LITAN & PETER J. WALLISTON, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY 
STUDIES, THE GAAP GAP: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE IN THE INTERNET AGE 23-33 (2000). Re-
170  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:123 
 
  
ment information can provide the foundation for a broad and com-
prehensive disclosure paradigm that could replace the flawed mate-
riality standard.185 Third, a market failure caused by interfirm exter-
nalities is likely to be particularly acute in the context of internal 
management information. Management information would seem to 
be of substantial value to both a firm’s competitors and a firm’s in-
vestors, particularly in the context of reducing agency costs. So it is 
with respect to the disclosure of management information that dis-
tortions resulting from interfirm externalities are likely to be most 
significant. 
                                                                                                                    
cent studies have found that public companies’ financial statements provide less explana-
tory power as to a company’s stock price than they had in the past. See Baruch Lev & Paul 
Zarowin, The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them, 37 J. ACCT. 
RES. 353 (1999); Stephen Brown, Kin Lo & Thomas Lys, Use of R2 in Accounting Research: 
Measuring Changes in Value Relevance over the Last Four Decades (July 8, 1999) (unpub-
lished   manuscript ),   available    at    http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
141056 (last visited July 5, 2004); J. Chang, The Decline in the Value Relevance of Earn-
ings and Book Values (University of Pennsylvania, Working Paper, 1998). 
 185. Both the Securities and Exchange Acts require that public companies disclose 
“such further material information . . . as may be necessary to make the required state-
ments . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1999) (Securities Act Filings); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.12b-20 (1999) (Exchange Act Filings). This requirement echoes President Roosevelt’s 
call that “no essentially important element attending the [issuance of securities] shall be 
concealed from the buying public.” SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 53 (quoting 73 CONG. REC. 
937, 954 (1933)). The Supreme Court has, in turn, defined information as material under 
these Acts “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would con-
sider it important” in determining the value of a company’s securities. TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (interpreting the materiality standard in the con-
text of a proxy statement); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988) (apply-
ing the TSC Industries materiality standard in the context of a lawsuit brought under sec-
tion 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, explaining that “materiality depends on the significance 
the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information”). Le-
gal scholars have identified various difficulties in implementing this so-called materiality 
standard. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723 (1989) (proposing applying different material-
ity standards under different circumstances); Fang & Jacobs, supra note 175 (identifying 
complications from the SEC’s decision not to provide a bright-line rule as to when informa-
tion is material); John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and De-
mise of an Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41 (1998) (reviewing SEC efforts to 
require disclosure of unethical conduct); Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Informa-
tion in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972) (differentiating between “hard” and 
“soft” information and arguing for increased required disclosure of soft information). But 
the problems with the materiality standard are even more fundamental than this scholar-
ship indicates. As a practical matter, public companies simply do not disclose the informa-
tion that sophisticated investors find useful in valuing a company’s securities. See supra 
notes 119-22 and accompanying text. Nor is there an adequate theoretical justification for 
the materiality standard. Why should public companies be required to disclose all informa-
tion an investor might find useful without any consideration of costs? Surely a sophisti-
cated investor would not endorse such a cost-blind disclosure requirement. But if costs are 
included, the clarity of the materiality standard would be blurred by the questions of which 
and how costs should be weighed in making disclosure decisions. 





A.   The Content and Relevance of Management Information 
 A firm’s consolidated financial results provide only a limited indi-
cation of the health and worth of the company. There is a wealth of 
additional information that both managers and investors turn to 
when valuing a public company and determining how well it is man-
aged. 
1.    The Information Managers Use to Understand Their Own 
Businesses 
The information a firm’s managers use to understand a company’s 
operations varies from manager to manager and from company to 
company. However, common elements and practices have evolved.186 
The information used to manage the firm’s operations, in addition to 
summary financial reports, can be separated into four categories: (1) 
operation-specific financial reports; (2) product profitability analyses; 
(3) other performance measurements; and (4) future investment ana-
lyses.187 The first category—operation-specific financial reports—
encompasses the financial results generated by operating units 
within a firm, such as the financial results from a particular retail 
outlet or a certain line of business. The second category—product (or 
service) profitability analyses—encompasses analyses of the profit-
ability of the goods or services that the firm sells, typically on a per-
unit or per-service basis. One challenge in carrying out a product 
profitability analysis is the difficulty in determining how fixed costs 
should be allocated among the various products the firm produces, a 
problem that has been a central focus of managerial accounting.188 
The third category—other performance measurements—refers to the 
information that is used to evaluate a firm’s operations and is typi-
cally quantitative, but not exclusively financial. For example, a firm 
might monitor the average “life” of its customers or the quality rat-
ings of its products. It is increasingly common for firms to identify a 
small number of such measures, often called “value drivers,” to moni-
                                                                                                                    
 186. One particularly useful source of information about the tools that managers use 
within the firm is managerial accounting, a field of study devoted to measuring, evaluat-
ing, and managing business performance within the firm. See generally Christopher D. Itt-
ner & David F. Larcker, Assessing Empirical Research in Managerial Accounting: A Value-
Based Management Perspective, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 349, 350-55 (2001) (reviewing the 
evolution of managerial accounting over the past forty years). Managerial accounting pri-
marily focuses on the question of how a manager’s evaluation tools can and should be 
structured to optimize the firm’s performance. So the findings from this field of study need 
to be used with some caution when applied to the question of what information might be 
subject to disclosure regulation.  
 187. This taxonomy is consistent with that presented in RAY H. GARRISON & ERIC W. 
NORREEN, MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING (10th ed. 2003). 
 188. Much of what is now known as managerial accounting was formerly known as cost 
accounting for this reason. 
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tor and manage the performance of the firm. A survey of the informa-
tion companies use to manage their operations found: 
[C]ompanies increasingly are integrating these various practices 
using a comprehensive “value-based” management (hereafter 
VBM) framework. . . . 
 . . . .  
 The value-based management approach represents an extension 
of more than four decades of managerial accounting research and 
practice. . . . 
 . . . .  
. . . The VBM framework extends these ideas to highlight the iden-
tification of the firm’s financial and non-financial value drivers, 
and the feedback loop from performance to the subsequent reas-
sessment of objectives, strategies, and organizational design and 
control.189 
The fourth category—future investment analyses—refers to the fi-
nancial modeling managers undertake to evaluate new business op-
portunities. Investment analyses derive projected cash flows and 
other financial results for a potential business opportunity from a de-
tailed set of operating and financial assumptions. Such assumptions 
might include, for example, estimates of future prices, productivity 
levels, and consumer behavior. 
 Each of these four types of management information is useful: (1) 
in determining the value of the company’s securities; (2) in measur-
ing the competence of the firm’s management; and (3) in exposing 
opportunities for the firm’s competitors. The difficult question is 
whether it is feasible or beneficial to require disclosure of some or all 
of this management information. First, it is helpful to consider if the 
information that investors use to value securities is comparable with 
the information that manager’s use to run their businesses. If there 
is management information that is not used by investors, it is 
unlikely that requiring its public disclosure would be welfare-
enhancing. 
2.    The Information Sophisticated Investors Use to Value 
Companies 
Studies carried out by accounting and investor trade groups dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s to determine how sophisticated investors 
value companies are instructive.190 The goal of these investor studies 
                                                                                                                    
 189. Ittner & Larcker, supra note 186, at 350-55. 
 190. See supra note 119 (describing the circumstances leading up to these studies). The 
focus here on information used to value a company’s securities does not mean that this in-





was to identify what information, beyond that already disclosed by 
public companies, would be helpful to sophisticated investors.191 
 The first of these studies, published in 1993, was carried out by 
the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) 
and titled Financial Reporting in the 1990’s and Beyond (“the AIMR 
Study”).192 AIMR is an organization whose membership consists of 
over 50,000 investment professionals from over 100 countries and is 
“the largest and most important organized group of financial state-
ment users in [the U.S.] economy and the world.”193 The AIMR Study 
found that its membership wanted companies to disclose more inter-
nal management information.194 
 In 1994, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) published Improving Business Reporting–A Customer Focus 
(“the Jenkins Report”).195 AICPA is the U.S. accounting industry’s 
trade association. The connection between management information 
and the information sophisticated investors use is evident in a ques-
tion posed in the introduction to the Jenkins Report: “Can effective 
business reporting exclude new performance measures on which 
management is focusing to manage the business?”196 As part of its 
work on the Jenkins Report, AICPA conducted a survey of 1200 so-
phisticated investors to “identify the types of information users be-
lieve are the most useful in valuing securities.”197 The Jenkins Report 
concluded:  
To meet users’ changing needs, business reporting must: 
 
(a) Provide more information with a forward-
looking perspective, including management’s 
plans, opportunities, risks, and measurement 
uncertainties. 
 
(b) Focus more on the factors that create longer 
term value, including non-financial measures 
indicating how key business processes are per-
forming. 
 
(c) Better align information reported externally 
with the information reported to senior man-
                                                                                                                    
formation is not also valuable for reducing agency costs. See supra notes 151-66 and ac-
companying text. 
 191. These studies did not consider the possibility of making disclosure of this addi-
tional information mandatory, which is the issue considered here. 
 192. See AIMR REPORT, supra note 119. 
 193. Id. at 10. 
 194. Id. at 85-86. 
 195. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 119. 
 196. Id.  ch. 1, at 16. 
 197. Id.  ch. 2, at 716. 
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agement to manage the business.198 
 
Thus, the Jenkins Report also concluded that the information that 
investors consider most useful in valuing a company’s securities is 
essentially the same as the information that managers use within the 
firm. 
 In 1998, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the 
organization formerly responsible for establishing generally accepted 
accounting principals (GAAP), started a research project that fol-
lowed up on the findings of the Jenkins Report and the AIMR Study. 
Upon the completion of research in 2001, FASB released four reports 
(“FASB Studies”),199 one of which focused on improving the business 
and financial reporting by public companies (“the Upton Report”).200 
That report concluded “[u]sers value disclosure of nonfinancial in-
formation. Presentation of nonfinancial performance information in 
metrics that can be tracked from period to period would enhance the 
usefulness of that information.”201 Again, sophisticated investors 
want access to the business operating information generated and 
used within the firm. 
3.   Evidence that Management Information Is Not Already 
Disclosed 
Before considering if regulatory intervention could efficiently in-
crease the disclosure of certain management information, an addi-
tional issue needs to be addressed. Given the amount of information 
that public companies already disclose, the information available to 
investors through other channels, and the fact that sophisticated in-
vestors already use management information to value and monitor 
public companies, it is necessary to consider whether requiring addi-
tional disclosures of management information by public companies 
would be useful to investors. 
Markets are notoriously efficient. Professional investors do not 
consistently outperform the stock market,202 and stock market prices 
reflect not only the information held by any one investor but also ag-
gregate all information available to the market.203 There is also a 
sizeable industrial espionage industry.204 Still, several lines of evi-
dence suggest a substantial gap remains between current disclosure 
practices and the level of disclosure that publishing management in-
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formation would entail.  
First, the AIMR Report, the Jenkins Report and the FASB Studies 
were each undertaken because of concerns about the growing gap be-
tween the information that public companies were disclosing and the 
information executives were using internally to manage operations.205 
While these studies focused on determining what information sophis-
ticated investors were using to value companies, the studies also re-
viewed the types of information that public companies were already 
disclosing. One of the FASB Studies, for example, reviewed disclo-
sure practices in eight industries to determine the extent to which 
detailed management operating information was being disclosed by 
public companies.206 For each of these eight industries, nonfinancial 
disclosures were reviewed in six categories: (1) business data; (2) 
management’s analysis of business data; (3) forward-looking informa-
tion; (4) information about management and shareholders; (5) back-
ground about the company; and (6) information about intangible as-
sets. The study concluded that “businesses currently provide consid-
erable non-financial information, although perhaps less in the form 
of explicit metrics that can be tracked from period to period.”207 Even 
this optimistic reading of the data208 makes clear that nothing close to 
complete management information is being disclosed. Both legal and 
finance scholars have noted a similar paucity of useful business in-
formation in public company disclosures.209 
Even if public companies do not publish a substantial amount of 
management information, this does not mean that their management 
information cannot otherwise be obtained by investors and competi-
tors. For example, it should not matter that General Motors does not 
include in its public filings information about how much it charges 
for each of its car models when an investor need only go to the Inter-
net or the local car dealership to access this information. There is, 
however, evidence that suggests that stock market prices do not in-
corporate undisclosed management information. Financial econo-
mists have generally rejected the strong form of the efficient capital 
market hypothesis (ECMH), which holds that all private information 
about a company is reflected in a company’s share price.210 In fact, 
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one of the main reasons financial economists have rejected the strong 
form of the ECMH is the apparent value of internal management in-
formation.211 Financial economists have consistently found that cor-
porate insiders outperform the market when trading in their own 
company’s stock, showing that managers have access to information 
that is not immediately reflected in the company’s stock price.212 
 Another point suggesting that management information has in-
cremental value is that sophisticated investors invest resources in 
gathering this type of information.213 Also, in transactions where the 
information that companies share with investors is not made publicly 
available, investors receive a substantially greater amount of man-
agement information than do investors in public companies.214 This 
suggests that there would be an incremental benefit to investors from 
receiving additional management information.215 Finally, valuation 
textbooks focus on management information as a central component 
in determining a company’s value.216 
B.   Constructing a Requirement to Disclose Additional  
 Management Information 
 To require the disclosure of all management information would 
certainly be ill-advised. Does an investor in a public company have 
any reason to know how much is spent on every pencil the company 
buys? What benefit could come from forcing a company to disclose 
the features of a product that the company has made a substantial 
investment in, but has not yet released? Would a company ever pre-
pare projections in a way that is not significantly biased by the fact 
that this information is going to be publicly disclosed?  
                                                                                                                    
reviewing the relevant empirical evidence); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 
46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991) (providing an updated review of the empirical evidence on the effi-
cient markets hypothesis); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the 
Fraud in the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911-12 n.11 (1989) (“The empirical 
evidence to date (with some exceptions) appears to establish the validity of the weak and 
semi-strong but not the strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.”). 
 211. See ROSS ET AL., supra note 202, at 359. 
 212. See supra note 52. 
 213. A related concern might be that if sophisticated investors are already using this 
type of information to value stocks, its publication by companies should not impact share 
prices. There are two answers to this concern. First, as noted in the text, this information 
does not appear to already be incorporated into share prices. See supra notes 52, 184. The 
second answer is that this is not an absolute issue of whether information is incorporated 
into share prices, but an incremental one of the extent to which information is incorporated 
into share prices. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossi-
bility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980). 
 214. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text. 
 215. It is possible, but unlikely, that this benefit from additional management informa-
tion is no longer relevant once a firm’s shares are publicly traded. 
 216. See, e.g., ERICH HELFERT, TECHNIQUES OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS: A GUIDE TO 
VALUE CREATION 461-67 (11th ed. 2003); TOM COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING 
AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES, 70-71 (3d ed. 2000). 





 Before evaluating the efficacy of requiring the disclosure of man-
agement information, three restrictions are offered for the type and 
amount of management information that might be subject to a dis-
closure requirement. The goal of these constraints is to develop a 
subset of management information for which a disclosure require-
ment might be welfare-enhancing. The management information 
that meets these various criteria is defined as Disclosable Manage-
ment Information, or DMI. Each restriction addresses a different 
concern. First, the disclosures need to be of interest to and compre-
hensible by an investor. Second, a disclosure requirement will create 
disincentives to invest in information-gathering activities. Therefore, 
a disclosure requirement is likely to be more efficient if it focuses on 
information that is produced incidentally to other productive activi-
ties and is already gathered within the firm, rather than on informa-
tion that is produced to provide a competitive advantage from its 
proprietary use.217 Third, regulation costs will be a critical component 
for determining the efficacy of a disclosure requirement. Other things 
being equal, information that would be subject to a disclosure re-
quirement should neither be easily manipulated nor be administra-
tively difficult to make subject to a disclosure requirement. 
1.   Restricting Disclosure Requirements to Information Useful to 
Investors 
 Management information subject to a disclosure requirement 
should exclude extraneous or trivial information.218 Management in-
formation is generated at every level of an organization. To deter-
mine the appropriate level of detail to which a disclosure require-
ment should apply, we can look at the way a company uses informa-
tion within the firm. The sophisticated investor and the company’s 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) would be interested in information at 
a similar level of detail. The CEO is reviewing and building the com-
pany from the firm-wide perspective, just as the investor is con-
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cerned with the overall value and management of the firm. There-
fore, the level of detail of information subject to a disclosure require-
ment should be on par with the level of detail of information typically 
utilized by a company’s CEO.219 At this level of detail, the amount of 
information subject to a disclosure requirement might be substantial, 
but just as this information is useful to a CEO in managing the firm, 
this information would also be useful to a sophisticated investor in 
evaluating the firm and its management. 
2.   Restricting Disclosure Requirements to Limit Disincentive 
Effects 
A disclosure requirement should focus on information that would 
continue to be produced despite its disclosure. Such a focus would re-
duce the disincentives caused by a disclosure requirement.220 This 
concern suggests two different types of restrictions on the manage-
ment information that would be subject to a disclosure requirement: 
(1) certain proprietary information should be shielded from a disclo-
sure requirement, and (2) disclosures should only be required to be 
made on an annual basis.  
 For the purposes of constructing DMI, information that identifies 
specific product attributes should be excluded. Management informa-
tion includes much information—such as product life expectations, 
user opinions, quality measures, and projected profitability—that 
would be useful, even if specific product features were not revealed. 
This is not to deny that even information “sanitized” in this way 
could prove valuable to a company’s competitors, but “sanitizing” 
would reduce the disincentives caused by a DMI disclosure require-
ment.221 
                                                                                                                    
 219. Direct reliance on the actual practices within the firm would be too easily avoided. 
If actual practices within the firm were the standard, very little information would be pro-
vided to the CEO; rather, all detailed information would be provided to those executives 
one level below the CEO. 
 220. The alternative to a “disclose if gathered” rule, a “gather and disclose” rule, does 
not create these disincentives but may be socially costly in other ways. See infra note 250. 
 221. The SEC currently recognizes a company’s interest in protecting proprietary in-
formation from disclosure. Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(ii) (1999) (providing that an 
issuer is not required to disclose narrative information concerning new business lines and 
products “the disclosure of which would affect adversely the registrant’s competitive posi-
tion”). Moreover, this concern is now given overriding priority. The result is that very little 
internal management information is disclosed. More preferable would be a provision com-
parable to the right to seek confidential treatment from the Commission under Rule 406 of 
the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.406 (1999). Rule 406 does not set out the ground on 
which the Commission might grant confidential treatment, but does require the applicant 
for confidential treatment to provide “a detailed explanation of why, based on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case, disclosure of the information is unnecessary for the 
protection of investors.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.406(b)(2)(iii) (1999). This exemption is generally 
applied to information that is not material but the disclosure of which is required, such as 
certain contracts. On this provision, see generally Comizio, supra note 29. 





One example of how such a disclosure regulation might be struc-
tured in this way comes from the disclosure requirements imposed on 
companies with oil and gas exploration operations.222 Starting in 
1978, the SEC required companies with oil and gas exploration op-
erations to disclose information about the estimated value of their 
proven oil and gas reserves. The SEC imposed this requirement be-
cause traditional financial reporting methods, based on cost account-
ing, did not provide sufficient guidance as to the economic value of 
these assets.223 Oil and gas companies, however, are not required to 
specify which particular fields account for the value of the reserves 
reported. 
 The periodicity of the requirement to disclose management infor-
mation will also affect the extent of the disincentive created by a dis-
closure requirement. Increasing the frequency of required disclosures 
reduces the expected period during which a company can capture the 
private benefits undisclosed information may provide. Disclosure re-
quirements for public U.S. companies have varying periodicities 
(mostly quarterly and annual with interim period disclosure required 
in certain circumstances), depending on the type of information and 
the relative significance of the underlying event.224 The proposal here 
would be that companies be required to disclose DMI annually, which 
would give an average of at least six months of protection to the in-
formation subject to this disclosure requirement. 
3.   Restricting Disclosure Requirements to Reduce Regulation 
Costs 
 Disclosure requirements can only effectively be applied to infor-
mation that is in some way independently verifiable. One principle 
underlying GAAP is that gains and losses are only recognized based 
on actual transactions or, in certain circumstances, when there is a 
reliable way to independently verify the entry.225 Obviously, this 
standard of verifiability needs to be modified in the context of the 
disclosure of management information. Much management informa-
tion will not be generated in transactions with third parties. On the 
other hand, a looser standard (for example, was this information 
used within the company to manage the business?) could be too eas-
ily manipulated. 
 Management information subject to a disclosure requirement 
must have at least some element of independent verifiability. First, 
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this implies that neither projections nor forecasts should be subject 
to a disclosure requirement.226 The management information subject 
to a mandatory disclosure requirement could, instead, consist of op-
eration-specific financial reports, product profitability analyses, and 
other performance measurements.227 Each of these kinds of informa-
tion is based on data generated from actual operations within the 
firm. This is not to say that there will be no distortions caused by re-
quiring disclosure of this information, but only that defining DMI in 
this way should reduce some of the avoidance costs associated with a 
management information disclosure requirement.  
 In summary, DMI consists of management information: (1) at a 
level of detail commensurate with that customarily provided to a 
company’s CEO; (2) with specific product details removed and pub-
lished on an annual basis; and (3) generated from independently 
verifiable operating information. This formulation leaves some ques-
tions open. What would regulations implementing a requirement to 
disclose DMI look like? Would such regulations be standards-based 
or rules-based?228 Building on the three constraints provided here, 
the SEC would need to construct more detailed regulations specifying 
what management information would be subject to a disclosure re-
quirement. However, for the purposes of carrying out the preliminary 
estimate of the efficacy of imposing a DMI disclosure requirement, 
these restrictions suffice. 
C.   Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Requiring Disclosure of DMI 
 An analysis of the costs and benefits of requiring public compa-
nies to disclose DMI proceeds in three steps, following the component 
approach to evaluating a disclosure requirement developed above.229 
The first step is a comparison of the incremental production costs of 
disclosing DMI with the gains from DMI disclosure realized whether 
or not a firm has publicly traded securities. The second step is a com-
parison of DMI’s short-term competitive-disadvantaging costs with 
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competitor and consumer gains (or losses) resulting from the disclo-
sure of DMI. The third step is a comparison of the disincentives to 
invest in innovation and regulation costs associated with requiring 
DMI disclosure with the incremental gains from the disclosure of 
DMI realized when companies’ securities are publicly traded. The 
conclusion is that requiring disclosure of DMI is likely to be quite 
beneficial. 
1.   Private Costs and Benefits with the Disclosure of DMI 
 The benefits from the disclosure of DMI, whether or not a firm has 
publicly traded securities, would probably exceed incremental DMI 
production costs. In terms of benefits, disclosing DMI would provide 
insight into management performance in ways that current disclo-
sures do not. In terms of costs, because DMI is distilled from infor-
mation and analysis already produced for use within the firm, its 
production costs should be minimal.  
 A more precise way to explore the relationship between DMI pro-
duction costs and gains from DMI disclosure, realized whether or not 
a firm has publicly traded securities, is to review disclosure practices 
when the information that a company shares with its investors is not 
made available to the public at large.230 In these “private” transac-
tions, the level of information that a company chooses to disclose is 
primarily the outcome of the trade-off between marginal information 
production costs and private disclosure benefits. A preliminary re-
view of the disclosure practices in private transactions shows that 
the equivalent of DMI is consistently disclosed.  
With the assistance of a corporate law firm involved in numerous 
private-financing transactions, disclosure practices in several private 
transactions were reviewed.231 This review found that companies are 
typically required to disclose significant amounts of internal man-
agement information in private transactions. Below are selected sec-
tions of the disclosure requirements from a representative investor 
agreement:  
.11.2 Historical and projected gross profit and contribu-
tion by product line for the last three fiscal years, 
the current fiscal year and the next fiscal year; 
      . . . . 
.11.4 Minutes of recent meetings with senior manage-
ment to review operations on a division-by-division 
basis, with specific focus on operating projections, 
if available. 
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      . . . . 
.11.7 Comparison of initial budget to actual results, 
combined and for each division, including detail of 
expenses, for the last two fiscal years. . . . 
      . . . . 
.2.1 Provide copies of any staff, management or con-
sultant analyses of sales, markets or products of 
the Company, including market studies, marketing 
plans and customer surveys. . . . 
      . . . .  
.1.1 Equipment utilization charts by month and 
week . . . .232 
The information typically required to be disclosed in these private 
transactions, in fact, goes beyond what would be required under a 
DMI disclosure requirement.  
 There are, however, some difficulties with applying disclosure 
practices in private transactions to address this first comparison. 
First, there are limitations on the use of disclosure practices in these 
private transactions as a baseline for optimal disclosure practices 
generally.233 Second, even though DMI production costs are of the 
same character for private and public firms, production costs will be 
higher for a public firm because of the larger number of shareholders 
and the increased scrutiny applied to information that is publicly dis-
seminated.234 Information that may be cost-effective for a private 
firm to disclose might not be worth disclosing if the same company is 
public, regardless of the other costs or benefits of disclosure. The con-
clusion that benefits from the disclosure of DMI, available to public 
or private firms, outweighs the direct costs of producing and publish-
ing DMI must be preliminary at this time. 
2.   Public Costs and Benefits with the Disclosure of DMI 
 The second step in analyzing the efficacy of requiring the disclo-
sure of DMI by public companies is to compare the competitive dis-
advantage incurred by the disclosing firm with competitor and con-
sumer gains (or losses) from the disclosure of DMI. There are several 
reasons to expect that competitor and consumer gains from the dis-
closure of DMI will approximate or exceed the competitive disadvan-
tage suffered by the disclosing company. First, if retaining DMI pro-
vides monopoly power to the disclosing firm, the disclosure of this in-
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formation should produce a short-term gain in social welfare.235 Sec-
ond, if a firm could disclose certain components of DMI that would 
incrementally benefit the disclosing firm, this information would be 
disclosed voluntarily. Therefore, the incremental DMI disclosed as a 
result of a DMI disclosure requirement is more likely than not bene-
ficial to competitors and consumers. The net effect of transferring 
DMI from one firm to many firms in the short-term will be minimal 
or positive. 
3.   Disincentives to Invest and Regulation Costs Compared with 
Other Gains from the Disclosure of DMI 
 Four components remain to determine whether DMI should be re-
quired to be disclosed: (1) those gains from the disclosure of DMI only 
available to companies with public securities; (2) the improved allo-
cation of assets throughout the economy that may result from the 
disclosure of DMI; (3) the long-term disincentives to invest in innova-
tion from the disclosure of DMI; and (4) the regulation costs of im-
plementing a DMI disclosure requirement. These elements are now 
considered in turn. 
 The disclosure of DMI would trigger many of the benefits public 
companies receive from making disclosures.236 First, the disclosure of 
DMI could reduce agency costs in several ways. It would provide a 
much more direct and transparent way to monitor manager perform-
ance than does the financial information currently disclosed by pub-
lic companies. One persistent complaint from investors is the opacity 
of reported financial information.237 Managers are using an increas-
ingly sophisticated arsenal of analytic tools within the firm to under-
stand and evaluate their businesses and, in the process, are generat-
ing a wealth of information about company operations. This internal 
management information is precisely the type of information that in-
vestors use to value a company’s securities.238 In fact, the gap is 
growing between the usefulness of the information managers rely on 
for internal decisionmaking and the opacity of the information that 
public companies disclose.239 Disclosure of DMI would help close this 
gap. 
 Disclosure of DMI would also provide potential acquirers substan-
tially more information about target companies. This would improve 
the efficacy of the market for corporate control. Publishing DMI pro-
vides a potential acquirer access to the precise information necessary 
to determine whether there is an opportunity to create value through 
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an acquisition. One example of the usefulness of disclosure of this 
type of information is the relationship between the SEC requirement 
that oil and gas firms disclose the value of their proven reserves, 
starting in 1978, and increased takeover activity in the oil and gas 
exploration industries during the 1980s.240 
 The disclosure of DMI should also reduce the extent of informa-
tional asymmetries between those with access to inside information 
and other investors. Thus disclosure of DMI will reduce insider ex-
propriation opportunities,241 lower the firm’s cost of capital, and limit 
the other adverse consequences such informational asymmetries may 
have on insiders’ behavior.242 The disclosure of DMI could also im-
prove the allocation of assets throughout the economy. In the past 
five years it was striking how much real investments were driven by 
public company valuations.243 While it would be naïve to claim that 
increased disclosure would eliminate developments such as the dot-
com speculative bubble, it would also be suspect to claim that sub-
stantially increased disclosure of DMI would have no impact on the 
allocation of assets throughout the economy.244  
 With respect to long-term publication costs, DMI was constructed 
to minimize the long-term disincentives to invest in information 
gathering that its publication might entail. DMI is culled from in-
formation that managers are already producing to enhance value 
creation within their companies. It seems unlikely that the returns 
within the firm on such information would be substantially reduced 
by its disclosure, since optimizing operations within the firm will re-
main an important goal even if the business environment becomes 
more competitive. DMI also specifically excludes product feature in-
formation, and DMI would only be disclosed on an annual basis. 
 There are three components of regulation costs: administrative 
costs, avoidance costs, and regulatory waste.245 An estimation of the 
regulation costs of implementing a DMI disclosure requirement is 
necessarily preliminary. This is true with respect to estimating the 
administration costs of requiring disclosure of DMI for several rea-
sons. First, a detailed implementation scheme for a requirement to 
disclose DMI is not offered here. Second, the construction of effective 
regulation is an iterative process as more efficient requirements are 
developed and unanticipated costs are uncovered.246 Requiring disclo-
sure of DMI will certainly be both difficult and expensive. Appropri-
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ate disclosure requirements may need to be determined on an indus-
try-by-industry basis. That said, it is possible to estimate the prob-
able upper limit of the administrative costs of implementing a DMI 
disclosure requirement, based on the SEC’s budget. The overall 
budget of the SEC in 2002 was approximately $500 million.247 Given 
this overall budget, it seems unlikely that the incremental adminis-
trative costs of requiring disclosure of DMI would exceed $50 million 
per year.248  
 Avoidance costs incurred as a result of requiring disclosure of 
DMI can take two forms. First, companies could choose to under-
stand their businesses less precisely to avoid the disclosure of infor-
mation that might be of use to a competitor. But this is not an inevi-
table outcome of such a disclosure requirement. In fact, requiring 
disclosure of DMI may force firms to find new ways to construct com-
petitive advantages, which might even increase the production of 
DMI. Moreover, if the standard for DMI disclosure is not tied to 
whether information is already produced within the firm, as is the 
case with the requirement to disclose the value of oil and gas explo-
ration properties,249 then there would not be an incentive to produce 
less information within any one firm.250  
Second, avoidance costs may be incurred as fewer companies 
choose to become public in the United States or in other ways avoid 
disclosing DMI. Romano, for one, argues that it would be virtually 
impossible in practice to require a public company to disclose com-
petitively disadvantaging information.251 Romano cites an article by 
Kitch, which reviews the history of federal public company disclosure 
requirements, to support this conclusion. Romano states: “Kitch fur-
ther contends that it is virtually impossible in practice to implement 
a disclosure regime that includes proprietary information—either 
firms will not meaningfully disclose information that can benefit 
their competitors, or they will delist to avoid such disclosure.”252 The 
statement that Romano refers to is made by Kitch, after he reviews a 
dispute in the late 1930s about what information public companies 
would be required to disclose by the SEC. Kitch states: 
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So ended the challenge to securities disclosure based on the need 
for secrecy. By [the end of the 1930s] most issuers had learned that 
the disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act did not affect 
their business, or if they did, had modified their businesses so dis-
closure would not be threatening, or had delisted from an ex-
change, finding immunity from disclosure regulation in the over-
the-counter market.253 
But Kitch’s conclusion is contradicted by his other findings. Kitch re-
views how numerous substantive disclosure requirements were suc-
cessfully implemented over the course of the next sixty years, all 
without a flight from U.S. public capital markets.254 
 In fact, there are many reasons to be skeptical of the conclusion 
that it would be impossible to require disclosure of competitively dis-
advantaging information. First, there is a long history of objections to 
mandatory disclosure requirements, based on concerns that imposing 
a particular disclosure requirement would be catastrophic. Such con-
cerns have consistently proven to be overblown.255 Second, a com-
pany’s managers already make disclosures contrary to their short-
term interests. This is because disclosure requirements already en-
tail, at least in part, a commitment by managers to disclose informa-
tion in circumstances when it is against their immediate interest to 
do so.256 A requirement to disclose competitively disadvantaging in-
formation does not, therefore, require managers—who are responsi-
ble for complying with disclosure requirements—to behave in a fun-
damentally different way with respect to disclosure policies than 
they already do. Third, financial economists have found that many 
public company disclosures are value-relevant.257 One would expect 
at least some of this value-relevant information to also be useful to a 
company’s competitors.258 Fourth, the argument that a requirement 
                                                                                                                    
 253. Kitch, supra note 34, at 874. 
 254. See, e.g., id. at 788-815 (describing the segment reporting requirements and man-
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 256. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
 257. See, e.g., Holthausen & Watts, supra note 35. 
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sure provided competitively useful information, but doubting that this occurs). The au-
thor’s work experience, as an investment banker, venture capitalist, and public company 
executive, involved just this type of careful review of mandatory public company disclo-
sures.  





to disclose competitively disadvantaging information would lead to 
the flight of capital from U.S. public equity markets overstates the 
ease with which companies can choose to exit these markets. For one 
thing, it may be difficult for a U.S. public company with a large num-
ber of shareholders to delist.259 As importantly, the SEC has substan-
tial control over if and when a company domiciled or doing business 
in the United States can elect to be exempt from the disclosure re-
quirements of the Securities and Exchange Acts.260 The ability to re-
main private is to a large extent created by the SEC.261 Fifth, the re-
cord with respect to the imposition of requirements to disclose com-
petitively disadvantaging information is mixed. On one hand, efforts 
to impose a requirement on companies to disclose quantitative in-
formation about the profitability of various segments of their opera-
tions were fraught with difficulty.262 On the other hand, within cer-
tain industries the SEC has effectively implemented regulations that 
led to the disclosure of competitively disadvantaging information. For 
example, starting in 1978 the SEC required companies with oil and 
gas exploration operations to disclose the economic value of their 
proven reserves, and these companies have generally complied with 
these regulations.263 Sixth, the ability of companies to disclose infor-
mation without also disclosing proprietary information is implicitly 
based on the assumption that proprietary information can be inex-
pensively unbundled from information of value to the firm’s various 
constituencies, which may not always be the case.264 Finally, there is 
no scholarly work that directly considers the costs and benefits of 
companies exiting the U.S. public capital markets. 
 A sweeping rejection of any requirement that public companies 
disclose competitively disadvantaging information, because it would 
be impossible to implement such a requirement, is not consistent 
with the evidence. This is not to imply that costs from disclosing 
competitively disadvantaging information are illusory or to reject the 
                                                                                                                    
 259. See Rock, supra note 13, at 682-84. 
 260. Currently firms with fewer than 500 shareholders whose shares are not traded on 
a national stock exchange and have not engaged in a public offering are not required to 
provide periodic disclosure statements. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(a), (g) (2000). 
 261. This touches on the separate, albeit related, question of where the demarcation 
line should be between public and private companies. If the argument of this Article is cor-
rect that mandatory disclosure requirements ameliorate interfirm externalities, then this 
demarcation line should be reconsidered. 
 262. Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(b) (1999) (requiring public companies to disclose 
their financial performance based on the various segments in which they operate); see 
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 12, at 76-77 (pointing to the difficulties in im-
plementing segment-reporting requirements and the limited apparent-value relevance of 
this information when disclosed). But see Fox, Issuer Choice, supra note 15, at 595-98 (ar-
guing that segment-reporting requirements did lead to the disclosure of competitively dis-
advantaging information). 
 263. But see supra note 28. 
 264. See supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text. 
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claim that some companies will choose to remain private or otherwise 
alter their business practices because of the costs associated with 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Rather, the relevant question is 
the extent to which a particular requirement to disclose competi-
tively disadvantaging information is enforceable and, if so, at what 
cost. In the case of DMI, the costs of regulation may even vary from 
industry to industry. 
 As for the costs of regulatory waste, without specific regulations to 
consider it is not feasible to evaluate such costs in the context of a 
DMI disclosure requirement.  
4.   Political Feasibility of Implementing a DMI Disclosure 
Requirement 
 Related to the question of the regulation costs of DMI disclosure is 
the question of whether it is politically viable to implement a DMI 
disclosure requirement.265 A preliminary consideration of the political 
feasibility of enacting substantially increased disclosure require-
ments of this type is inconclusive. On one hand, the enactment of the 
Securities and Exchange Acts, albeit under different circumstances 
and in a different era, was a much more dramatic undertaking. A 
DMI disclosure requirement would not require new legislation, since 
a DMI disclosure requirement falls well within the scope of the mate-
riality definition, as well as the grant of regulatory authority to the 
SEC.266 On the other hand, the SEC has chosen thus far not to re-
quire disclosure of most of this management information, despite the 
nominal reliance of the SEC on the materiality standard and the 
findings of numerous studies that this is precisely the type of infor-
mation that sophisticated investors find useful.267 It may be that the 
SEC has not yet realized the immense costs of an interfirm external-
ities market failure on public company disclosure practices,268 or it 
may be that requiring disclosure of this information is simply not po-
litically feasible. 
 One way to understand the behavior of the SEC, or any adminis-
trative agency for that matter, is as an organization that serves the 
interests of the group or groups it regulates.269 There is certainly evi-
dence of powerful interest groups attempting to influence the SEC. 
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For example, Arthur Levitt, SEC Commission Chairman from 1992 
to 2000, noted in his book, Take on the Street, the extent to which in-
terest groups attempt to shape disclosure policy: 
During my seven and a half years in Washington, I was constantly 
amazed by what I saw. And nothing astonished me more than wit-
nessing powerful special interest groups in full swing when they 
thought a proposed rule or piece of legislation might hurt them, 
giving nary a thought to how the proposal might help the investing 
public. With laserlike precision, groups representing Wall Street 
firms, mutual fund companies, accounting firms, or corporate 
managers would quickly set about to defeat even minor threats.270 
Many academic critics conclude that meeting the demands of power-
ful interest groups provides the best explanation for how the SEC 
constructs disclosure requirements.271 It is also possible, as suggested 
by Professor Stephen J. Choi of Boalt Hall Law School and Professor 
A.C. Pritchard of Michigan Law School, that the SEC suffers from a 
number of cognitive biases in its rulemaking process.272 If the “regu-
latory capture” or “behavioral economics” paradigm is a complete de-
scription of the SEC’s actions, then the analysis here is unlikely to 
lead to regulatory action. 
 On the other hand, it may be that the SEC is at least in part in-
terested in increasing social welfare generally. For example, Levitt 
systematically tried in his tenure as SEC Commission Chairman to 
give weight to the interests of individual investors273 even though 
Levitt was aware these investors had limited political influence: “In 
the Washington lobbying hierarchy, the corporation is by far the 
most muscular power center, followed by workers (in large part be-
cause of the efforts of organized labor) and consumers. Shareholders, 
and especially individual investors, come last.”274 The mandatory dis-
closure of value-based information by companies with oil and gas ex-
ploration operations also provides evidence that the SEC can act in 
the way called for in this Article.275 
                                                                                                                    
 270. LEVITT, supra note 43, at 236. 
 271. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 117, at 725 (concluding that “an interest group story 
has more explanatory power” than a public interest explanation of how the SEC constructs 
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D.   Summary of Findings with Respect to a Requirement to 
 Disclose DMI 
 Estimating the efficacy of requiring the disclosure of DMI turns 
out to depend primarily on the trade-off between the regulatory costs 
of implementing this disclosure requirement and the many benefits 
generated by these disclosures. This third component of the analysis 
of the efficacy of requiring DMI’s disclosure proves to be pivotal, be-
cause: (1) the direct cost of preparing and disseminating DMI ap-
pears to be easily offset by the agency cost-reducing benefits DMI 
disclosure provides, whether or not a firm has publicly traded securi-
ties; (2) the costs of transferring proprietary information from one 
firm to many firms should be minimal; and (3) DMI is already pro-
duced as a by-product of efforts to improve firm performance. What 
then of the regulation costs of implementing a DMI disclosure re-
quirement as compared with gains available to public firms and the 
economy as a whole from the disclosure of this information? Imposing 
a DMI disclosure requirement would be a challenging and expensive 
task, but not a task that should be avoided for these reasons alone. 
DMI disclosure could have a broad efficiency-enhancing impact 
throughout the U.S. economy. The arguments for requiring disclo-
sure of DMI are compelling, even if this conclusion is necessarily pre-
liminary. 
V.   IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
 This Article addresses de novo the question of what, if any, in-
formation public companies should be required to disclose. Answering 
this question anew shows that the SEC should require the disclosure 
of substantially more management information by U.S. public com-
panies than it currently requires be disclosed.276 Without the disclo-
sure of DMI, investors have an unnecessarily opaque view of the eco-
nomic condition of the firm. Mandatory disclosure of DMI would pro-
vide investors a more effective way to monitor manager performance 
and encourage managers to focus on enhancing the value of the firm, 
rather than on the more limited measures of performance that inves-
tors currently have access to.  
 If this is too brazen a conclusion for some, the SEC should at 
least devote resources to understanding the advantages and disad-
vantages of requiring disclosure of DMI. The presence of a market 
failure resulting from interfirm externalities explains how unneces-
sarily opaque disclosure practices can persist, and previous scholar-
ship has dramatically underestimated the potential costs of this 
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market failure.277 Any individual firm choosing to disclose DMI would 
be competitively disadvantaged, and even investors with interests in 
many public firms would not be able to capture all of the benefits 
from disclosure of DMI. However, from an economy-wide perspective, 
the benefits to be gained by increasing the transparency with which 
firms operate are substantial. 
 There are three additional ramifications of this finding. First is a 
recommendation for the SEC to change the way in which it develops 
public company disclosure requirements generally. Second, the find-
ings here advance the stalled scholarly debate about whether the 
federal regulation of public company disclosure practices is welfare-
enhancing. Third, given the findings here, arguments that issuers 
should be able to choose the regime under which their securities 
would be regulated need to be reconsidered.  
A.   Guidance to the SEC on How to Construct Disclosure 
Requirements Generally 
 The implications for the SEC of the findings in this Article go be-
yond recommending requiring the disclosure of DMI. There are three 
additional steps the SEC should take immediately. First, the SEC 
currently gives substantial weight to companies’ concerns about the 
costs of disclosing competitively disadvantaging information.278 In 
fact, a competitive-harm justification for withholding disclosures 
should be most suspect. This Article shows that concerns about the 
costs of disclosing competitively disadvantaging information can lead 
to the adoption of suboptimal disclosure practices. Moreover, the 
competitive-disadvantaging costs of disclosure are unlikely to be an 
important factor in determining which disclosure requirements en-
hance welfare.279 Competitive harms are likely to be offset by gains 
by other firms, or by consumers generally. The correct analysis of the 
efficacy of disclosure requirements focuses primarily on the trade-off 
between regulation costs and the other benefits provided to firms and 
the economy from requiring disclosures. 
 Second, the SEC is avoiding an honest dialogue about what crite-
ria should be used to construct public company disclosure require-
ments by nominally relying on the materiality standard. The SEC 
does not, in practice, use the materiality standard to determine what 
public companies should be required to disclose.280 If the SEC formal-
ized and publicized how mandatory disclosure requirements are de-
veloped, describing the costs and benefits of a proposed disclosure re-
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quirement, the appropriate dialogue could begin. As it stands, the 
SEC establishes disclosure practices in a way that is not helpful in 
advancing our understanding of the appropriate scope and content of 
public company disclosure requirements. 
 Finally, disclosure practices in private transactions can be used to 
provide guidance to the SEC as to what kinds of information public 
companies should be required to disclose. Disclosure practices in pri-
vate transactions were useful in evaluating the efficacy of a manda-
tory DMI disclosure requirement.281 This result can be generalized. 
Disclosure practices in private transactions provide guidance as to ef-
ficient public company disclosure requirements, when a disclosure 
requirement does not create a significant disincentive to invest in in-
formation-gathering activities and regulation costs are not substan-
tial. Using private transaction disclosure practices as a benchmark 
would provide the SEC a more solid foundation for the edifice of pub-
lic company disclosure requirements already in place. 
B.   Advancing the Debate on the Efficacy of Federal Disclosure 
Regulation 
 The scholarly debate on the efficacy of federal disclosure regula-
tion is now essentially stalled for lack of evidence. Scholars argue 
about what to do in the absence of compelling evidence for or against 
imposing federal disclosure requirements on public companies. Al-
most twenty years ago Easterbrook and Fischel concluded:  
[I]f all we can say is that we cannot identify either benefit or det-
riment from a given set of rules, the injunction to leave well 
enough alone has great force. At the same time, the study of regu-
lation is sufficiently advanced to support a contrary injunction: 
Most regulatory regimes reduce aggregate welfare, although they 
also profit special interest groups.282 
Little has changed, except for the arguments as to what to do in the 
absence of compelling evidence.283  
 This Article offers a new methodological approach to determine 
when disclosure requirements are welfare-enhancing, building on 
two insights. First, developing a comprehensive microeconomic model 
of disclosures by public companies reinforces the need to proceed by 
analyzing disclosure requirements individually.284 When evaluating a 
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specific disclosure requirement, it becomes possible to include infor-
mation about costs and benefits that is not available when consider-
ing the impact of disclosure requirements in aggregate. Second, a 
model is developed to compare the various costs and benefits of im-
posing a disclosure requirement on public companies.285 Even if the 
reader is uncomfortable with the conclusion that DMI should be re-
quired to be disclosed, a coherent way to determine the efficacy of 
other federal disclosure requirements is now available. 
C.   Reconsidering the Debate on Allowing Issuers to Choose Their 
Securities Regulation Regime 
 Some legal scholars argue that issuers should be able to choose 
the regime under which their securities are regulated, just as corpo-
rations currently choose their state of incorporation.286 These propos-
als suggest that an issuer choice scheme would be superior to man-
datory federal securities regulation, because issuer choice would 
mitigate many of the inefficiencies inherent in a noncompetitive 
regulatory regime. But issuer choice proposals assume that there are 
no market failures with respect to the disclosure practices of public 
companies for which imposing disclosure requirements would be an 
efficient solution.287  
 The proponents of issuer choice in securities regulation are correct 
in observing that current scholarship does not provide a convincing 
rationale for imposing federal disclosure requirements on all public 
companies. But this Article challenges the conclusion that there are 
no adequate justifications for imposing mandatory disclosure re-
quirements. First, the argument provided in this Article shows that 
mandatory disclosure of DMI would be efficient.288 Second, even if the 
details of the argument for disclosing DMI do not impress these crit-
ics, a method by which welfare-enhancing regulatory interventions 
can be constructed is developed.289 The challenge now for the propo-
nents of issuer choice in securities regulation is to offer a mechanism 
by which certain mandatory provisions would be included in any 
regulatory regime, so that some of the benefits of an issuer choice re-
gime could be maintained. A hybrid regulatory scheme, including 
some mandatory provisions and some provisions applicable only in 
certain regimes, could provide an attractive degree of flexibility. This 
may be a promising approach for issuer choice advocates, and would 
be parsimonious with the ongoing internationalization of securities 
regulation. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Answering anew the question of what, if any, information public 
companies should be required to disclose yields several significant 
results. First, developing a comprehensive microeconomic analysis of 
disclosures by a public firm shows that it is only possible to evaluate 
disclosure regulation by assessing specific disclosure requirements. 
Second, constructing a method to evaluate specific disclosure re-
quirements reveals that previous scholars have dramatically under-
estimated the potential cost of a market failure in public company 
disclosure practices. Third, weighing the costs and benefits of requir-
ing disclosure of certain internal management information indicates 
that public companies should be required to disclose substantially 
more of the information used within the firm to manage operations 
than is currently required to be disclosed. 
 The original proponents of federal securities legislation sensed 
that something was amiss with unregulated public company disclo-
sure practices. That intuition is supported here. Unfortunately, these 
proponents did not correctly identify what caused public companies 
to adopt unnecessarily opaque disclosure practices. Brandeis’ call for 
increased disclosure by public companies was premised on his incor-
rect belief that the primary benefit of requiring public company dis-
closures was fraud deterrence.290 As a result, objections were not 
raised when exemptions from disclosure requirements were granted 
for proprietary information at the time the Securities and Exchange 
Acts were enacted.291 In the years since, the SEC has consistently de-
ferred to the interests of firms in keeping proprietary information 
confidential.292 This Article shows it is just such concerns that may 
cause a significant market failure in public company disclosure prac-
tices. Exemptions granted from disclosure requirements based on 
“competitive harm” should be highly suspect. 
 And even if the original proponents of federal securities regula-
tion did not correctly specify the market failure at play, the findings 
here are consonant with the larger agenda of the Progressive move-
ment. Progressives did not consider regulatory intervention an alter-
native to market mechanisms, but rather as a way to promote the 
workings of markets by correcting market failures. The Securities 
and Exchange Acts, with their emphasis on disclosure, do offer a 
powerful tool to improve the effectiveness with which public markets 
monitor and discipline the managers of public firms. 
 Despite the dramatic evolution of information technologies and 
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management practices over the past seventy years, regulators and 
legislators have been unable and unwilling to fundamentally recali-
brate the scope of public company disclosure requirements. This Arti-
cle provides both the tools and rationale to undertake a needed ex-
pansion of public company mandatory disclosure requirements. With 
the findings here, a coherent foundation is now available to deter-
mine which disclosure requirements should be imposed on public 
companies. 
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